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>In the second half of The Problem of Political Authority, I consider how an anarchist society might work, specifically, an “anarcho-capitalist” society. In thi

by rqebmm 11y ago

>In the second half of The Problem of Political Authority, I consider how an anarchist society might work, specifically, an “anarcho-capitalist” society. In this society, the services now provided by governmental police would instead be provided by competing protection agencies, hired either by individuals or by associations of property owners. Protection agencies, knowing that violence is the most expensive way of resolving disputes, would require their customers to seek peaceful resolutions of any disputes with other individuals. Agencies would decline to protect those who either willfully initiated conflicts with others or refused to seek peaceful resolutions; any agencies that acted otherwise would find themselves unable to compete in the marketplace due to the soaring costs created by their troublesome clients. The services presently provided by government courts would instead be provided by private arbitrators, hired by individuals who had disputes with one another. Laws, rather than being made by a legislature, would be made by the arbitrators So we'll have "protection agencies" who have military arms and logistics arms to manage the necessary affairs of the agency. Those agencies will somehow provide equipment to their military, or else they'll be inferior to the other agencies, meaning they will not be giving protection free of charge, instead they will run capitalist markets within their domain and somehow extract a profit (either by taxing transactions, or charging individuals). How exactly is that different from the current nation-state paradigm?

nickff 11y ago
Please read the book if you would like a complete explanation of Huemer's ideas. In short, the protection agencies he describes as one alternative to the current coercive state is as follows: There can be a large number of different-sized protective agencies which operate under contract with either neighborhood associations, or individual landowners (depending on size and preferences). Some may be large, while others will be small; there is no reason to believe economies of scale exist for protective agencies as they do for car companies. It is unlikely that the agencies will fight with one another, as they have strong disincentives (on multiple levels) to do so. It is most likely that they would operate under subscription contracts, and the market for protection will likely be a lively and competitive one. Huemer's anarchy is very different from the current state; it is not 'the same with one or two changes'.
- rqebmm 11y ago
  > there is no reason to believe economies of scale exist for protective agencies Seriously? There is a huge advantage to being the biggest, baddest agency. If you're substantially larger than the competition you just go to them and say "hi there, give me all your stuff or we kill all of you and your clients". > It is unlikely that the agencies will fight with one another, as they have strong disincentives You're completely leaving out the incredibly strong incentive of "Give me your stuff or I kill you". It's infinite profit! There are two ways history has proven to prevent "Hobbesian War" as he calls it: One incredibly powerful military hegemony, or a delicate balance of multiple exactly equally powerful military hegemonies. Anytime neither of those exist in an area, you get war because it's a lot easier to take someone else's stuff than it is to make your own. To think otherwise is hilariously naiive.
  - nickff 11y ago
    I will not be able to address your arguments one-by-one without rewriting chapters of Huemer's book. I would recommend that you or anyone else interested in these points read the book and/or the numerous discussions he has had online with other academics. It will be very difficult for you to come up with off-the-cuff arguments which will best a book written by an experienced philosopher over more than a year, and you are unlikely to win over anyone who agrees with Huemer in this forum for exactly that reason. If you wish to discredit him, I suggest you find an academic who has written a thoughtful critique of "The Problem of Political Authority", or that you write a book or paper on its flaws. Anything short of that is most likely to be self-satisfying but ineffective rhetoric.
- philwelch 11y ago
  The problem is that there's no guarantee that the protection agencies will all operate from anarcho-capitalist premises. All you need is one anarcho-socialist protection agency that protects property rights based on need rather than on dibs, and you have unavoidable internal violence.
  - nickff 11y ago

by rqebmm 11y ago

nickff 11y ago

Please read the book if you would like a complete explanation of Huemer's ideas. In short, the protection agencies he describes as one alternative to the current coercive state is as follows: There can be a large number of different-sized protective agencies which operate under contract with either neighborhood associations, or individual landowners (depending on size and preferences). Some may be large, while others will be small; there is no reason to believe economies of scale exist for protective agencies as they do for car companies. It is unlikely that the agencies will fight with one another, as they have strong disincentives (on multiple levels) to do so. It is most likely that they would operate under subscription contracts, and the market for protection will likely be a lively and competitive one. Huemer's anarchy is very different from the current state; it is not 'the same with one or two changes'.

rqebmm 11y ago
> there is no reason to believe economies of scale exist for protective agencies Seriously? There is a huge advantage to being the biggest, baddest agency. If you're substantially larger than the competition you just go to them and say "hi there, give me all your stuff or we kill all of you and your clients". > It is unlikely that the agencies will fight with one another, as they have strong disincentives You're completely leaving out the incredibly strong incentive of "Give me your stuff or I kill you". It's infinite profit! There are two ways history has proven to prevent "Hobbesian War" as he calls it: One incredibly powerful military hegemony, or a delicate balance of multiple exactly equally powerful military hegemonies. Anytime neither of those exist in an area, you get war because it's a lot easier to take someone else's stuff than it is to make your own. To think otherwise is hilariously naiive.
- nickff 11y ago
  I will not be able to address your arguments one-by-one without rewriting chapters of Huemer's book. I would recommend that you or anyone else interested in these points read the book and/or the numerous discussions he has had online with other academics. It will be very difficult for you to come up with off-the-cuff arguments which will best a book written by an experienced philosopher over more than a year, and you are unlikely to win over anyone who agrees with Huemer in this forum for exactly that reason. If you wish to discredit him, I suggest you find an academic who has written a thoughtful critique of "The Problem of Political Authority", or that you write a book or paper on its flaws. Anything short of that is most likely to be self-satisfying but ineffective rhetoric.
philwelch 11y ago
The problem is that there's no guarantee that the protection agencies will all operate from anarcho-capitalist premises. All you need is one anarcho-socialist protection agency that protects property rights based on need rather than on dibs, and you have unavoidable internal violence.
- nickff 11y ago