Seems to me that the catuskoti was already a concept in western philosophy, only we didn't give the group a name because we prioritised true and false above the

Seems to me that the catuskoti was already a concept in western philosophy, only we didn't give the group a name because we prioritised true and false above the other two possibilities: contradiction and indeterminacy. Also seems to me that ineffability falls under indeterminacy. The author seems to try to distinguish between the two by saying there are things we might be able to know, and things we will never be able to know. Being a layman and not studied in philosophy and logic, it seems to me that indeterminacy is enough to encapsulate ineffability. This is illustrated by the numerous examples the author gives on attempts to explain the ineffable: this immediately makes it indeterminate, going by the author's use of logic. The author then goes on to talk about ordinal numbers, and presents what is purported to be an ineffable phrase: the least ordinal that cannot be referred to There are more ordinals than ordinary language can refer to, and one of these must be the least. But, by using that phrase we are referring to it. This is an obvious contradiction, but we know there must be one such ordinal. The author uses this to say that since we cannot talk about it, but it exists, it is ineffable. I say that this is unnecessary, it is enough to say the ordinal is indeterminate precisely because we cannot refer to it (determine it). That it took us until the 20th century to imagine these ideas in mathematics and logic doesn't speak to any shortcomings of western logic with regards to contradiction and indeterminacy, in my opinion. It merely reflects the priorities of eastern and western thought. This is illustrated by the efforts of Bertrand Russell with his Principia. Through the centuries, western thinkers had made advances by considering what is true and what is false, and taking contradictions as dead ends that do not produce interesting areas of study. Russell tried to take this as far as he could with Principia, and in doing so inadvertently revealed the limitations of how far we can advance, limitations that were detailed by Kurt Godel and his incompleteness theorems. I say that, since we have advanced so far as to know the limits, now we are having more to say about contradiction and indeterminacy, and we are now saying it in a more precise way than Buddhist philosophers imagined in their day.