3 ms·
The first I'd heard of DDC was here, so I might misunderstand some parts of the concept. But Wheeler seems to state it pretty plainly in this summary: > In t
by wyldfire 11y ago
The first I'd heard of DDC was here, so I might misunderstand some parts of the concept. But Wheeler seems to state it pretty plainly in this summary:
> In the DDC technique, source code is compiled twice: once with a second (trusted) compiler (using the source code of the compiler’s parent), and then the compiler source code is compiled using the result of the first compilation. If the result is bit-for-bit identical with the untrusted executable, then the source code accurately represents the executable.
I'd speculate that you need at least one of the compilers to be trusted otherwise they could both be subverted to produce X, Y that would produce matching V, W binaries with the attack still in place on both.
- throwaway7767 11y ago> I'd speculate that you need at least one of the compilers to be trusted otherwise they could both be subverted to produce X, Y that would produce matching V, W binaries with the attack still in place on both. Ideally one of them is not compromised. But if both are compromised but by different backdoors, the resulting binary will not be bit-for-bit identical (as they include different backdoors). So you can still detect it, and that's really all DDC can do. The only way to get a bit-for-bit identical binary from two compromised compilers is if they both have the same backdoor.