4 ms·

I haven't read the full paper, so I don't have a complete understanding of this scheme... But what stops a malicious attacker from registering a bunch of dummy

• deleted 11y ago
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• azinman2 11y ago
  Similarly what do you do for the first couple of users that need to legitimately login but you don't know the secret yet? (I also haven't read the paper, but the concept is intriguing).
  • est 11y ago
    Hmm, hard coded bootstrap dummy users? (Evil)
  • mvksaa 11y ago
    There is the option to "leak" a portion of the users' salted hashes, so that the users can be verified upon reboot. This leaked information harms overall security but, even with this option, the scheme is still better than regular salted-hashes.
• darkmighty 11y ago
  Maybe the probability that your dummy accounts share the same "line" (their terminology) will be low if the number of users is large enough? (and the number of "lines" is also large enough) Although this conflicts somewhat (but not assymptotically) with the need to have enough users at any "line" so it can be easily computed by the server from scratch when it needs to restart.
• fryguy 11y ago
  They have the concept of "shielded" users, which are users that are shielded by the shared secret, but don't contribute to it. Though, they don't really specify when to put people into the shared-secret group and when to leave them as shielded. I suppose it's an exercise for the user.