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You are not assured the binary corresponds to the source code. Understanding why and eliminating this misconception is vital for FOSS community to prevent the s
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
You are not assured the binary corresponds to the source code. Understanding why and eliminating this misconception is vital for FOSS community to prevent the saboteurs from getting in a better position of attack. A reproducible build by X different parties only shows that the source code was converted into a binary the same way X times. The conversion process could be malicious, buggy, and so on. The binary might be defective or a rootkit. This work does not mean the binary is trustworthy.
Solving source-to-binary correspondence is a tougher problem whose solution I linked to in a comment below. You have to deal with malicious developers, interface issues, input validation, basic compiler bugs, optimization-induced security failures, undefined behavior, bootstrapping, and distribution. These projects mainly help with just that last part whereas most compiler-related, security failures are compiler/optimization bugs. Certifying compilers plus subversion-resistant development methodology and tools are only way to address others.
Note: If you're curious, the cutting edge of this research is the CertiCoq project that is trying to produce an executable straight from a specification in Coq theorem prover. Many projects that eliminate entire classes of problems rely on Coq for specification of behavior and/or proof it's correct. Examples are CompCert compiler, Quark browser, and Chlipala's Bedrock. These typically get extracted into ML for regular compilation. A verified, transformation from Coq specification to executable code would be quite a leap past that and the ultimate tool for proving correctness of other tools. Especially true given how many solutions like above are built with it. They might automatically benefit. Work in progress, though.