3 ms·
It's actually been known for a while as I described in this comment with bootstrapping method in the reply after it: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
It's actually been known for a while as I described in this comment with bootstrapping method in the reply after it:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10182282
That addresses a huge range of problems while Wheeler's work mainly addresses the Thompson attack, which actually isn't the main problem in practice. Optimization-induced defects, regular compiler bugs, and undefined behavior are more likely to hit you. There's also been work showing how to use them intentionally to produce source that looks OK but is subverted by the bug(s). There's also clever subversions possible by compiler authors themselves. So, no, you still need to trust the toolchain even if you've verified you received the right one. Hence, the more thorough approaches like I described that eliminate more risks.
Good to know mainstream at least finally cares about the build problem. Wheeler indeed got word out most effectively on this with his SCM page (below). They'll gradually learn of the other issues and maybe try to solve them. A better foundation would be a nice start, though. An even better start would be building on stuff that already does what they're trying to do better than they're doing it. That's rare by FOSS crowd but it would really help them here given all the work in academia on this problem.
http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/scm-security.html