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Towards the end of an iterated prisoner's dilemma, your opponent has fewer upcoming opportunities to punish you, and so you may as well defect (especially since
by MBlume 11y ago
Towards the end of an iterated prisoner's dilemma, your opponent has fewer upcoming opportunities to punish you, and so you may as well defect (especially since your opponent may be thinking the same thing). The interaction in the study really doesn't resemble an iterated prisoner's dilemma, but this may still explain why people instinctively defect more as an ongoing interaction is nearing completion.
- linhchi 11y agoThe interaction resembles a repeated PD because people are cheating the experimenter :D The ending effect happens all the time in experiments. If people play the repeated prisoner's dilemma, they'd cooperate UNTIL the last round. If people play the public good game, they'd contribute generously UNTIL the last round. Because if the prioner's dilemma and public good game are played one shot, the rational thing to do is to cheat right away (defect / not contribute). Being cooperative (in hope to make the world a better place) goes against the selfish motives. So, at the last round, because there is no tomorrow, it's just like the game is played one-shot, people'd cheat. The theory of game goes too far to say that, if people are rational, they work the game backward (backward induction) and at the 9th round, they'd cheat, and at the 8th round, they'd cheat...-> they'd cheat right from the first round. But experiments show that people are myopic or at least dont cheat right in the first round, they wait until last round. Because of experiments, theorists have to add the social image. Social image can be built in the first 9 round, but in the last round, not anymore.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]