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I don't understand what it is we should "beware" of? What's the perceived threat? In theory, even if the NSA themselves were creating these site certificates,
by Someone1234 11y ago
I don't understand what it is we should "beware" of? What's the perceived threat?
In theory, even if the NSA themselves were creating these site certificates, because of how they're created (i.e. you generate the keyset yourself locally, they sign the public part), it should be secure.
So as I said: What is the perceived threat condition here?
- andrewstuart2 11y agoThat's a great example, I'll have to keep it in mind. I'd never thought of such a great example that clarifies how strong the security is, and how it's orthogonal to the trust model.
- callahad 11y ago> because of how they're created (i.e. you generate the keyset yourself locally, they sign the public part), it should be secure. Note that if the CA has the authority to sign certificates, they don't need your private key. They can just locally create a CSR for your domain, sign it, and have their own equivalently valid certificate for your domain. Moreover, in the absence of HPKP, any CA can do this for any domain.
- nailer 11y ago+1 HPKP, also Certificate Transparency: http://www.certificate-transparency.org http://www.certificate-transparency.org Google requires CT for all EV certs.
- macspoofing 11y agoI don't know about the threat, but this solves one use case. A local server connection from a browser pointed at an online web service. For example, Plex which gives you a web-based directory of movies you own, but the movies themselves are hosted on your private server).