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> The submarine's captain ordered the launch of a nuclear torpedo, and his decision was affirmed by the sub's political officer — which normally would be enough
by dingaling 11y ago
> The submarine's captain ordered the launch of a nuclear torpedo, and his decision was affirmed by the sub's political officer — which normally would be enough to authorize the use of a nuclear weapon.
It sounds scary, but in fact there was quite a lot of procedural tolerance for the use of underwater nuclear devices; they wouldn't have crossed the NATO 'tripwire', for example, whereas using a tactical nuke of the same yield on land would have done so.[0]
Hence it doesn't automatically follow that the release of a nuclear torpedo would have escalated beyond the tactical level.
[0] In fact just months after the Cuban crisis the Canadian forces began an investigation as to whether they should up-gauge to nuclear anti-submarine weapons, simply to overcome targeting and effectiveness problems.
- ClintEhrlich 11y agoI think it was pretty damn scary, and I would be very interested to see any sources you know about that suggest otherwise. I'm not being sarcastic, I really would appreciate a link if you have one. I have read some arguments about why the Russian submarine captain was not actually committed to using the nuclear torpedo, but nothing about the risk of escalation having been low. Based on my memory of the Cold War literature, there was quite a bit of concern about a naval nuclear exchange triggering strategic nuclear war. A quick search seemed to confirm my recollection: "[T]he doctrines and operational procedures associated with sea-based nuclear weapons are subject to less well-defined thresholds and, in some cases, are quite provocative. Moreover, there are good reasons for believing that the first use of nuclear weapons could take place at sea, and for concern that the escalation dynamics of nuclear warfare in this theater are far less constrained than those that would attend nuclear operations on land." (Ball, Desmond. "Nuclear war at sea." International Security (1985): 3-31.) The risk of escalation would have been intensified during the missile crisis, because the underlying dispute involved strategic weapons. If a Soviet nuclear weapon destroyed an American carrier battle group, at minimum the U.S. would have retaliated with tactical nuclear weapons. And there would be significant pressure to target land-based military installations in order to achieve a proportionate response, because the Soviets were so much less dependent on their Navy than the U.S. At that point, all bets are off, particularly given the Soviet's proclivity for interpreting any American action in the worst possible light. Escalation to extinction-level global nuclear war was certainly not guaranteed, but it was arguably the most probable outcome. One cannot reasonably dispute that it was well within the realm of possibility.
- CamperBob2 11y agoI don't find this credible in the least. Any nuclear shenanigans would have pushed the leadership of one or both countries over the brink. Never mind the American response. On a game-theoretic basis, it would have made sense for the Soviets to follow up the submarine attack with an immediate overwhelming strike, even if they had no idea what (if anything) provoked the torpedo launch in the first place.
- tempestn 11y agoThis is an entertaining read and demonstrates how it might have gone down had that first shot been fired: http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=65071 http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=...