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interesting point that we rarely see tactical weapons of mass destruction being frequently such as nuclear weapon. It's interesting that Japan lost both wars to

interesting point that we rarely see tactical weapons of mass destruction being frequently such as nuclear weapon. It's interesting that Japan lost both wars to sudden technological advancements from opposing side and they aren't ever used again. The turtle ships weren't alone but it was a gifted korean naval commander who ironically never commanded a navy before and figured shit out as the war was unfolding. The Korean general would even be hailed as a mythical figure and admired by WW2 Japanese naval generals.

vonmoltke 11y ago
The turtle ship wasn't sudden (the Koreans built the first examples over a century earlier) and didn't alter the war. Toyotomi Hideyoshi had the entire peninsula under his control until the Ming Emperor intervened.
- yongjik 11y ago
  For some definition of "control." Admiral Yi fought twenty-something battles (seems like the exact number is hard to say because it's difficult to define what constitutes a "battle"), and never lost a single one. (That's not to say the Korean navy didn't suffer devastating losses... but that was when Yi was in prison thanks to the idiot king who bought the disinformation supplied by Japanese spies.) Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind?
  - curiousjorge 11y ago
    not to leave out that Admiral Yi was arrested and tortured for saving the country and becoming more popular than the King himself. Dissent was very high and there are some records of Korean civilians who chose to side with the Japanese in hope they could be liberated from the oppressive pre-North Korea Chosun dynasty, that ultimately failed it's people. You won't find many sympathizers for the Chosun Kings apart from the one hit wonders like Sejong who invented the Korean alphabet.
  - vonmoltke 11y ago
    > Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind? Depends on how much that is true. Replacements are definitely a problem, but medieval armies had significant ability to supply locally. On top of this, the Toyotomi army was never blockaded on the peninsula; Yi's actions significantly disrupted the sea lines of communication but never truly cut or controlled them. Without the Ming army to fight Toyotomi would not have been under significant strain. Even with a Ming army on the field and Yi disrupting his SLOC Toyotomi was still able to extract a truce while he held the southern half of the peninsula. Regardless, what the Joseon navy was able to accomplish it did because Yi was a badass admiral, not because of turtle ships or other special weapons. That was the original point.
    - yongjik 11y ago
      Well, I have no problem with your last paragraph, but I think you overestimate the mobility of medieval armies. "Finding local supply" basically means sacking towns, which is not always a viable option (ask Napoleon), especially in a war that lasted seven years. The Japanese army did succeed in initially overwhelming Korean forces with supreme military tactics, so much so that they entered Seoul basically unscathed, only to find that the king and his courtiers have fled north. From what little I know, it seems that the Japanese forces didn't quite understand the situation. In traditional Japan (from what I've heard), if your force wins the battle and enters the enemy castle, you have won. The enemy's people are now under your rule and their food and supply is yours. Instead, Japanese forces found itself surrounded in a sea of hostile troops and militia bands, who will (incredibly) fight to the bitter end. Not unlike what the US found in Iraq, but without the ridiculous military advantage. Korean army's major military victories included the battle of Haengju (near Seoul) and Jinju (southeastern Korea, near present-day Busan), which all happened within one year since the war broke. A major reason why Toyotomi could parley for truce that involved Japan securing the southern part of Korea, was that Chinese forces had no reason to stake their lives for someone else's country, yet they still had enough political power to force Korea to the talking table.

vonmoltke 11y ago

The turtle ship wasn't sudden (the Koreans built the first examples over a century earlier) and didn't alter the war. Toyotomi Hideyoshi had the entire peninsula under his control until the Ming Emperor intervened.

yongjik 11y ago
For some definition of "control." Admiral Yi fought twenty-something battles (seems like the exact number is hard to say because it's difficult to define what constitutes a "battle"), and never lost a single one. (That's not to say the Korean navy didn't suffer devastating losses... but that was when Yi was in prison thanks to the idiot king who bought the disinformation supplied by Japanese spies.) Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind?
- curiousjorge 11y ago
  not to leave out that Admiral Yi was arrested and tortured for saving the country and becoming more popular than the King himself. Dissent was very high and there are some records of Korean civilians who chose to side with the Japanese in hope they could be liberated from the oppressive pre-North Korea Chosun dynasty, that ultimately failed it's people. You won't find many sympathizers for the Chosun Kings apart from the one hit wonders like Sejong who invented the Korean alphabet.
- vonmoltke 11y ago
  > Anyway, that raises a philosophical question: if your troops and their supplies need to be delivered across the water, and if your enemy is controlling that water, how much are you controlling the land behind? Depends on how much that is true. Replacements are definitely a problem, but medieval armies had significant ability to supply locally. On top of this, the Toyotomi army was never blockaded on the peninsula; Yi's actions significantly disrupted the sea lines of communication but never truly cut or controlled them. Without the Ming army to fight Toyotomi would not have been under significant strain. Even with a Ming army on the field and Yi disrupting his SLOC Toyotomi was still able to extract a truce while he held the southern half of the peninsula. Regardless, what the Joseon navy was able to accomplish it did because Yi was a badass admiral, not because of turtle ships or other special weapons. That was the original point.
  - yongjik 11y ago
    Well, I have no problem with your last paragraph, but I think you overestimate the mobility of medieval armies. "Finding local supply" basically means sacking towns, which is not always a viable option (ask Napoleon), especially in a war that lasted seven years. The Japanese army did succeed in initially overwhelming Korean forces with supreme military tactics, so much so that they entered Seoul basically unscathed, only to find that the king and his courtiers have fled north. From what little I know, it seems that the Japanese forces didn't quite understand the situation. In traditional Japan (from what I've heard), if your force wins the battle and enters the enemy castle, you have won. The enemy's people are now under your rule and their food and supply is yours. Instead, Japanese forces found itself surrounded in a sea of hostile troops and militia bands, who will (incredibly) fight to the bitter end. Not unlike what the US found in Iraq, but without the ridiculous military advantage. Korean army's major military victories included the battle of Haengju (near Seoul) and Jinju (southeastern Korea, near present-day Busan), which all happened within one year since the war broke. A major reason why Toyotomi could parley for truce that involved Japan securing the southern part of Korea, was that Chinese forces had no reason to stake their lives for someone else's country, yet they still had enough political power to force Korea to the talking table.