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I work for a Sudbury School (Arts&Ideas in Baltimore) where this is our mantra. I've long take it as an article of faith that humans are wired this way. But I

by jostylr 11y ago

I work for a Sudbury School (Arts&Ideas in Baltimore) where this is our mantra. I've long take it as an article of faith that humans are wired this way. But I am astounded by the comment about artificial intelligence. Is there any kind of paper that explores this? Not even sure how to set it up or quantify such a thing, but that would be incredible to prove.

hellbanner 11y ago
http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_BBS_1999_perceptual_symbol_systems.pdf http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Ba... "Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components – not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored"
- nitrogen 11y ago
  Fascinating abstract. I think I may have accidentally downvoted your comment though, when I meant to upvote (on a phone). I downloaded the PDF; hopefully I can find time to read it eventually. There are some gaps between the layers of abstraction presented in this abstract that I hope would be addressed by the full paper.
  - hellbanner 11y ago
    Their main point was that pre-computers, cognition was theorized to be tied to physical stimulus. When humans learned how to code computers, "AI" was theorized as existing in "black boxes" of pure abstract symbol manipulation. The paper discusses how this doesn't make sense, and how cognition must be tied to biological sensing to be "smart".
dchichkov 11y ago
I doubt that "physical manipulation" is a requirement for machine intelligence. It may as well be any kind of manipulation in any kind of reach and consistent environment. It could potentially be rich enough virtual environment. But, in practice, the only "rich enough" environment currently available is the physical world. And virtual classroom is no substitution...
sdg1 11y ago
There's a somewhat relevant concept in Seymour Papert's book Mindstorms. Papert talks about "body-syntonicity" where the act of drawing a circle on the computer screen with LOGO can be seen as bridging children’s sense and knowledge about their own bodies to something abstract. Young children would often pretend to be the LOGO turtle, acting out commands on the floor, during stages of planning a LOGO program, or while debugging LOGO code. It has also been a strategy for teachers to introduce programming and procedural ways of thinking. This video shows this in action (with some followup comments from Papert): https://youtu.be/bOf4EMN6-XA?t=254 https://youtu.be/bOf4EMN6-XA?t=254
- rurounijones 11y ago
  When I was in school with the BBC micro and the LOGO turtle we had an actual physical turtle hooked up to the machine via a long cable. Needless to say this was much more popular with us than just the screen. I am sure it is partly for the robotic'ness of it but we would often walk around with the turtle as it was moving. So what you are saying and linked to I can well believe.
  - juanuys 11y ago
    This sounds great. Do you have any more information on the mechanical turtle? (consumer kit, or a side-project by an industrious teacher?)
    - obitoo 11y ago
      Here he is , as i recall it was a kit http://www.classicacorn.freeuk.com/8bit_focus/logo/logo.html http://www.classicacorn.freeuk.com/8bit_focus/logo/logo.html
    - rurounijones 11y ago
      This was a consumer kit aimed at schools. Looks like there were many different types as obitoo has another that I have never seen. http://gallery.nen.gov.uk/asset78077_1582-.html http://gallery.nen.gov.uk/asset78077_1582-.html
rsaarelm 11y ago
There is the theory of general causality developed by Judea Pearl, which as far as I've understood implies that you need to be able to purposefully affect the world you're observing in some way to do experiments before you are able to infer causal relationships even in theory. See eg. http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/if-correlation-doesnt-imply-causation-then-what-does/ http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/if-correlation-doesnt-impl...

by jostylr 11y ago

hellbanner 11y ago

http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_BBS_1999_perceptual_symbol_systems.pdf http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Ba... "Abstract: Prior to the twentieth century, theories of knowledge were inherently perceptual. Since then, developments in logic, statistics, and programming languages have inspired amodal theories that rest on principles fundamentally different from those underlying perception. In addition, perceptual approaches have become widely viewed as untenable because they are assumed to implement recording systems, not conceptual systems. A perceptual theory of knowledge is developed here in the context of current cognitive science and neuroscience. During perceptual experience, association areas in the brain capture bottom-up patterns of activation in sensory-motor areas. Later, in a top-down manner, association areas partially reactivate sensory-motor areas to implement perceptual symbols. The storage and reactivation of perceptual symbols operates at the level of perceptual components – not at the level of holistic perceptual experiences. Through the use of selective attention, schematic representations of perceptual components are extracted from experience and stored in memory (e.g., individual memories of green, purr, hot). As memories of the same component become organized around a common frame, they implement a simulator that produces limitless simulations of the component (e.g., simulations of purr). Not only do such simulators develop for aspects of sensory experience, they also develop for aspects of proprioception (e.g., lift, run) and introspection (e.g., compare, memory, happy, hungry). Once established, these simulators implement a basic conceptual system that represents types, supports categorization, and produces categorical inferences. These simulators further support productivity, propositions, and abstract concepts, thereby implementing a fully functional conceptual system. Productivity results from integrating simulators combinatorially and recursively to produce complex simulations. Propositions result from binding simulators to perceived individuals to represent type-token relations. Abstract concepts are grounded in complex simulations of combined physical and introspective events. Thus, a perceptual theory of knowledge can implement a fully functional conceptual system while avoiding problems associated with amodal symbol systems. Implications for cognition, neuroscience, evolution, development, and artificial intelligence are explored"

nitrogen 11y ago
Fascinating abstract. I think I may have accidentally downvoted your comment though, when I meant to upvote (on a phone). I downloaded the PDF; hopefully I can find time to read it eventually. There are some gaps between the layers of abstraction presented in this abstract that I hope would be addressed by the full paper.
- hellbanner 11y ago
  Their main point was that pre-computers, cognition was theorized to be tied to physical stimulus. When humans learned how to code computers, "AI" was theorized as existing in "black boxes" of pure abstract symbol manipulation. The paper discusses how this doesn't make sense, and how cognition must be tied to biological sensing to be "smart".

dchichkov 11y ago

I doubt that "physical manipulation" is a requirement for machine intelligence. It may as well be any kind of manipulation in any kind of reach and consistent environment. It could potentially be rich enough virtual environment. But, in practice, the only "rich enough" environment currently available is the physical world. And virtual classroom is no substitution...

sdg1 11y ago

There's a somewhat relevant concept in Seymour Papert's book Mindstorms. Papert talks about "body-syntonicity" where the act of drawing a circle on the computer screen with LOGO can be seen as bridging children’s sense and knowledge about their own bodies to something abstract. Young children would often pretend to be the LOGO turtle, acting out commands on the floor, during stages of planning a LOGO program, or while debugging LOGO code. It has also been a strategy for teachers to introduce programming and procedural ways of thinking. This video shows this in action (with some followup comments from Papert): https://youtu.be/bOf4EMN6-XA?t=254 https://youtu.be/bOf4EMN6-XA?t=254

rurounijones 11y ago
When I was in school with the BBC micro and the LOGO turtle we had an actual physical turtle hooked up to the machine via a long cable. Needless to say this was much more popular with us than just the screen. I am sure it is partly for the robotic'ness of it but we would often walk around with the turtle as it was moving. So what you are saying and linked to I can well believe.
- juanuys 11y ago
  This sounds great. Do you have any more information on the mechanical turtle? (consumer kit, or a side-project by an industrious teacher?)
  - obitoo 11y ago
    Here he is , as i recall it was a kit http://www.classicacorn.freeuk.com/8bit_focus/logo/logo.html http://www.classicacorn.freeuk.com/8bit_focus/logo/logo.html
  - rurounijones 11y ago
    This was a consumer kit aimed at schools. Looks like there were many different types as obitoo has another that I have never seen. http://gallery.nen.gov.uk/asset78077_1582-.html http://gallery.nen.gov.uk/asset78077_1582-.html

rsaarelm 11y ago

There is the theory of general causality developed by Judea Pearl, which as far as I've understood implies that you need to be able to purposefully affect the world you're observing in some way to do experiments before you are able to infer causal relationships even in theory. See eg. http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/if-correlation-doesnt-imply-causation-then-what-does/ http://www.michaelnielsen.org/ddi/if-correlation-doesnt-impl...