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I think there is an argument to be made that the ongoing requirement for "flexible" crypto represents a backdoor. We know enough to say it'll never be right. Ev
by tedunangst 11y ago
I think there is an argument to be made that the ongoing requirement for "flexible" crypto represents a backdoor. We know enough to say it'll never be right. Even in the 90s, when we didn't perhaps have hard earned experience, I think we knew enough to say it wasn't proven secure, and therefore the safe choice would be less flexible.
No, it's not specifying a particular backdoor, but if you make something hard enough you can be assured one will develop organically. And even if it's not deliberate malfeasance, can we at least call it callous negligence?
- bro-stick 11y agoTLS is a pile of IETF design-by-committee extensions uncomfortable with saying "no;" OpenSSL is a mountainous kitchen sink of TLS and other features. OpenSSL seems to "work," but the endless pattern of vulnerabities lies in the risky process in which code is developed, lightly tested and pushed out as a production release... That hasn't changed enough to convince me they're going to get proactive and stop SNAFUBAR anytime soon. 'cperciva was on the right track about a better protocol would encode parameters much more simply and have just enough options for an important gamut of use-cases. The issue is we're seemingly stuck on TLS everywhere and would require massive cost and coordination pains to use something, even if it were 10X better and formally-proven.
- dlitz 11y agoIt would be fairly cheap if we got our secure-connection APIs right. Upgrading the protocol should be as simple as upgrading any system library.