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Good to see OpenBSD in process of getting one. I previously thought that OpenBSD, or at least Theo, hated virtualization based on this rant: http://www.tylerkr
by nickpsecurity 11y ago
Good to see OpenBSD in process of getting one. I previously thought that OpenBSD, or at least Theo, hated virtualization based on this rant:
http://www.tylerkrpata.com/2007/10/theo-de-raadt-on-x86-virtualization.html http://www.tylerkrpata.com/2007/10/theo-de-raadt-on-x86-virt...
Or just x86's virtualization. Nothing different popped in my news feed until now. Has OpenBSD's position changed on the subject of virtualization? And is there a more recent post that explains their position?
- DArcMattr 11y agoTheo is objecting to the view that VMs are a security necessity.
- wcfields 11y agoAren't they though? With 0-days it makes sense to be able to snapshot non mission-critical systems, bring them offline, until a patch is found. Snapshotting alone is a security necessity when patching too. Very easy to rollback to a "good" state.
- metalliqaz 11y agoI haven't read it, but I assume the discussion was about sandboxing clients. From that perspective, any additional security would be defeated as soon as a client is able to affect the hypervisor or the host OS. So (according to Theo) if you can't write a secure host and/or client, the VM doesn't improve security.
- yellowapple 11y agoWhile I agree with him on a lot of things, this isn't one of them; security is all about layers, and it's not like OpenBSD hasn't steered clear of other forms of sandboxing (like chroots and systrace). This doesn't mean that virtualization should be relied on exclusively or even near-exclusively as a defense (which is what I suspect Theo was more objecting to, along with the point of "well if you can't write a secure operating system, what makes you think you can write a secure hypervisor?"), but rather that it should be used as an additional layer on top of (or rather, underneath) a bunch of others. It's like bulkheads on modern ships. Yeah, if you get a hole in your hull, you're gonna be in some (literally) deep water, but that bulkhead (so long as it's built right) could mean the difference between limping to the nearest harbor or sinking to the nearest seafloor.
- tedunangst 11y agoSomehow back when Amazon had to reboot every EC2 server to fix a Xen bug, my "insecure" hypervisor-less server didn't require such action. I think I'll prefer to keep sailing without that particular bulkhead.
- metalliqaz 11y agoYou've never had to reboot your server?
- Sanddancer 11y agoThe reboots were because Amazon cuts a lot of corners in their Xen setup because instances are supposed to be "disposable". A proper VM cluster would use dedicated storage nodes that export over something like iscsi, which would require just transferring a memory snapshot, or would use the native, slower, disk snapshotting migration. But that's just one of many ways AWS is rather broken from an operations standpoint.
- oblio 11y agoThing is, the AWS philosophy of considering everything short of data sources "disposable" leads to a lot more robust engineering. Yes, it makes Ops work more difficult, but as someone smart said regarding software: if something hurts, you're not going it often enough :)
- yellowapple 11y agoI'm pretty sure "if something hurts, you're not doing it often enough" doesn't apply to, say, arm-breakage or self-immolation :)
- ownagefool 11y agoWhat you call a proper VM cluster has been pretty terrible from my experience as both a developer on an early cloud and a consumer of large government facing clouds. Typically the network or SAN becomes oversaturated and the vm's shit the bed. AWS on the other hand was considerably more reliable and I'd argue they've made better decisions rather than cut corners.
- MichaelGG 11y agoSnapshotting is sorta orthogonal to virtualization though, isn't it? Just snapshot at the storage level, no?
- Sanddancer 11y agoKVM, VMware, and Xen all allow you to do a snapshot of memory as well as of disk. It's one of the tools used to migrate xen instances between nodes, for example.
- feld 11y agoand why can't you do that with containers or jails? or filesystem snapshots? or instant re-deploy to a known good state from ansible/puppet/salt/chef? Just because there's a nice mouse-navigable GUI for entry level Windows admins doesn't mean it's a good solution. if you need snapshots for doing updates it's because your software is fragile, undocumented, and you don't have a deployment procedure. Fix that, and upgrades will be easy and not scary.
- travem 11y agoOr you could have a consistent repeatable way of doing it across multiple apps and operating systems. I am not averse to your argument that doing it at the app level has benefits, but being able to do it at the VM level in a consistent way is going to be simpler when you expand beyond a handful of applications.
- forgottenpass 11y agoI agree that there is convenience to the execution controls VMs provide. But if you can't repeatably and easily stand up a replacement/duplicates of a system from configuration management and backups, then you don't actually have configuration management or backups.
- travem 11y agoSure, to be clear I'm not arguing against those things, I'm just arguing that VM level snapshots and clones are also a tool in the operational arsenal and is in fact a very popular one that works well in practice.
- forgottenpass 11y agoIt looks like I agree entirely with you, just not the guy that started this whole thread by saying VMs are a security necessity.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoMakes sense. I disagree with him in that they can definitely have benefit over regular OS for security. The reason is relative simplicity and ability to easily integrate security tech in versus a whole OS with legacy compatibility issues. This was proven in KVM/370, then VAX Security Kernel, then MILS, then Nizza Security Architecture, and then people started leveraging Xen for similar reasons albeit without the same assurance. The NSA's pentesters repeatedly failed to breach some of these despite years of effort while the OS's... see Snowden leaks and TAO catalog. Of course, I agree that VM's aren't necessary: one of many approaches one can use and don't get the job done by themselves. They are beneficial, though, as running security-critical components on a 4-12Kloc in kernel mode with mediated, simple interface should have way less impact than running it on 1Mloc+ with POSIX-style interface.
- yellowapple 11y agoTheo's more recent talks (like that one for ruBSD) seem to indicate that OpenBSD's looking to prioritize virtualization in order to stay competitive with other operating systems. It's also worth noting that OpenBSD has supported virtualization on some other platforms, too; for example, it can be used to manage SPARC logical domains (LDOMs).
- nickpsecurity 11y agoAppreciate it. Makes sense on competitiveness. Didn't know about the LDOM support. Interesting.
- ben_bai 11y agoThat E-Mail is from 2007... This is from 2013: https://youtu.be/OXS8ljif9b8?t=395 https://youtu.be/OXS8ljif9b8?t=395
- nickpsecurity 11y ago"That E-Mail is from 2007..." Yes, people have repeated that line since 2008. Readers certainly saw the timestamp. It was main Q&A and search result, though. Hence asking for modern post. "This is from 2013" And that's a start. Appreciate the link. I don't see many of his interviews but that was the first one I saw him admit to being behind. Good they're changing their attitude a bit. The expected and somewhat disappointing part is when he has no answer to what can be done to raise the bar past a few exploit mitigations. There's something like four decades of work (and worked examples) showing how to increase assurance of security in hardware, software, and systems. Especially in capability, microkernels, static analysis, covert channel analysis, and so on. He could... idk... apply some of that instead of mock and ignore it like most mainstream does. FreeBSD is ahead here with SEBSD and Capsicum work. One project did port OpenBSD to L4 kernel to isolate it in a protection domain. The idea, as in Nizza Security Architecture, is to be able to split system into legacy, untrusted stuff in VM and trusted, highly-assured components running directly on microkernel. A proven model that would benefit OpenBSD by dramatically reducing attack surface. This is done in embedded space (eg INTEGRITY, PikeOS Hypervisor) for up to 8 ISA's each for those wondering about portability. Just one of dozens of techs to draw on to increase assurance. Will be interesting to see if they draw on any of this or get left behind [again] by those that do.
- tedunangst 11y agoThe OpenBSD covert channel analysis team is understaffed at the moment.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoBoth EROS and Genode managed to do a lot of what I mentioned with less staff & time. Plus, with solid architecture that above components can leverage without doing all the highly assured stuff over and over again: what I call security ROI. Your huge TCB, drivers probably in kernel, and language-related issues are where I predicted most of the trouble would come from. (Did it?) Something like Nizza Security Architecture would benefit you along with interface checks you're already good at and a better language that translates to C with checks automatically inserted. Far as covert channels, Google Kemmerer's Shared Resource Matrix for a method that worked for amateurs and pro's alike on a budget. Any person handling a subsystem can apply it. Even using it on function call level can tell you a lot. If understaffed, just use it on any component handling secrets for storage and timing channels. Best bang for buck.
- 0x0 11y agox86 hardware support for virtualization has changed quite a bit since 2007, though. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X86_virtualization#Intel_virtualization_.28VT-x.29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X86_virtualization#Intel_virtu...
- nickpsecurity 11y agoTrue. Looks to have gotten a lot better, too.