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How is the control link key distribution problem the 'exact same' problem? The control link key is secured in the aircraft and at military bases. There's no add
by pvg 17y ago
How is the control link key distribution problem the 'exact same' problem? The control link key is secured in the aircraft and at military bases. There's no additional need for ad-hoc distribution, you never have to send a key to someone in a trench somewhere who's too busy shooting to put pants on. The entire point of the article is that the design decision not to encrypt the video was likely influenced by the problems of ad-hoc key distribution. To this reasoned analysis your response is 'hey just do key distribution!'. Doesn't seem very well thought out at all.
- anigbrowl 17y ago'What's the password of the day' is one of the oldest and most basic security measures in military history. Is it a tough technical challenge in a global theater? For sure. But I'll warrant that the bulk of military communications do not take place in clear anyway, so it's a manageable problem.
- notauser 17y agoThe point from the article is that the NSA doesn't permit 'password of the day' style encryption - it's all or nothing. For the operational requirements of the predator, nothing was better than all. They'd prefer an intermediate option, but it isn't available until procedures change.
- anigbrowl 17y agoI get that. It just seems kind of perverse to transmit in clear because scheduled encryption has risks of its own. Last time this was posted I mentioned that while interception of drone video by the Taliban or whoever is probably not that big of an operational threat, bigger strategic competitors like Russia and China have probably accrued a good lot of intelligence by amassing such data in quantity. Perhaps the NSA's thinking is that this is less critical than exposure of dynamic encryption models to the wild.
- stcredzero 17y agoLose a point for poor reading comprehension. (EDIT: Probably not comprehending muy actual proposal and knocking down your misread straw man.) Encrypt the uplink/downlink to protect it against satellite eavesdropping, worry about the distribution to users separately. Uplink/downlink video keys need to be distributed to the same folks who need the control link keys. Sorry, unless you mean something else, you are just wrong. Encrypting a video link drone->sat->base and leaving out the allies is the exact same key management problem that they are solving with the control link encryption. Basically, leave out drone->sat->allies and solve that another way.
- InclinedPlane 17y agoThe video data is redistributed to a wide list of folks, people on the battlefield, people in command posts both locally and remote. The control link is not redistributed, it is a closed link between the pilot and the UAV, the data is not needed elsewhere nor is it sent elsewhere. Do you see the difference?
- stcredzero 17y agoRead the proposal. Establish a secure link parallel to the control link. Use a different mechanism to redistribute. In that case, there is no difference in the key management of the first stage. Geez, how many times do I have to go over that?
- ErrantX 17y agoGood idea but there is too much delay in such a model. Even more so the extra complexity is too much of a trade off (see my other post)
- stcredzero 17y agoYes, but the point I'm making is that there is no difference in key management. Your assertion is that there is a latency problem. That may be true. But the key management for the 1st half would be the same.