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UAVs are flown by airmen sitting at comfortable desks on U.S. military bases, where key management is simpler. But the video feed is different. It needs to be a
by stcredzero 17y ago
UAVs are flown by airmen sitting at comfortable desks on U.S. military bases, where key management is simpler. But the video feed is different. It needs to be available to all sorts of people
Poppycock! At least encrypt the stream going up to and coming down from the satellite! If lots of people have to see it, redistribute it afterwards. The uplink/downlink encryption is the exact same key management problem as the command signal! Hell, why not use the same key. The video signal going up to and back from the satellite is hanging out there, accessible from the majority of earth's surface. But encrypt it and beam the encrypted signal to those "comfortable military bases." Then you can re-encrypt it for distribution, and completely change the key management problem to suit your needs. (Essentially make it into two key management problems. Divide and conquer.)
I usually like what Bruce has to say, but this blog post wasn't well thought out.
EDIT: Upon re-reading, Bruce's point is that it's the NSA's bureaucratic requirements that make it too cumbersome for an encrypted feed to be easily made available. So it's just easier for them to leave it unencrypted. I still say poppycock. If they were really being clever, they could "leave out encryption," but still obfuscate matters. (Both from the signal standpoint and from the bureaucratic standpoint.)
Even something like a "new compression algorithm" would probably be enough to flummox the Russian software program. If it were unique to the drones, then the sat-download program authors would have no economic incentive to implement it. (And some "representatives" of our interests could have talks with them about it if they happen to implement it anyway.) This isn't strong crypto, but it would at least raise the bar.
EDIT: To those with poor reading comprehension: the tactic is a bit of "divide and conquer." (Colloquially, not algorithmically.) Divide the "key management" problem into two: "Sat up/down link" and "distribute to allies." The "Sat up/down link" is the exact same key management problem as for the control link. Also, if you solve that key management problem by just using obscure compression, then you can distribute the video using ordinary website access controls on establishing streams. Not strong crypto, not uber-secure, but still better than what's there now.
- mbenjaminsmith 17y agoExactly. These drones (or similar drones) are able to fire laser or radio guided missiles. I can't believe fire command and control of the drones isn't handled with 'hardcore' security of some kind. But it was too hard to encrypt a video feed? I don't buy it.
- redcap 17y agoKey management is a tricky issue, especially when your neighborhood working with AT&T No Such Agency spies are the ones who get to dictate how keys are managed (i.e. same as if your adversary are soviet crypto-hackers).
- redcap 17y agoIn the Iraqi case, I'm guessing the bandwidth of the signal would be prohibitive to send out on anything other than satellite. Also, if you send it out again you will still have a key management problem if the data is encrypted. I do agree with the premise that if there is crypto it doesn't have to be strong as the enemy do not have a proper analytic capacity. While I also know that the current US defence chief wants gear to fight the war on his hands right now and down the track, but you'd think that they might have considered that crypto would be a good idea at some point and at least had some plans on how to incorporate it. At the moment it just looks like the US military were caught with their pants down.
- stcredzero 17y agoIn the Iraqi case, I'm guessing the bandwidth of the signal would be prohibitive to send out on anything other than satellite. So, by obfuscating with a "new compression algorithm" you can also actually do compression and save yourself a little bandwidth. This also gets you over bureaucratic hurdles. "By introducing this algorithm, we are save X gigabytes per whatever."
- pvg 17y agoHow is the control link key distribution problem the 'exact same' problem? The control link key is secured in the aircraft and at military bases. There's no additional need for ad-hoc distribution, you never have to send a key to someone in a trench somewhere who's too busy shooting to put pants on. The entire point of the article is that the design decision not to encrypt the video was likely influenced by the problems of ad-hoc key distribution. To this reasoned analysis your response is 'hey just do key distribution!'. Doesn't seem very well thought out at all.
- anigbrowl 17y ago'What's the password of the day' is one of the oldest and most basic security measures in military history. Is it a tough technical challenge in a global theater? For sure. But I'll warrant that the bulk of military communications do not take place in clear anyway, so it's a manageable problem.
- notauser 17y agoThe point from the article is that the NSA doesn't permit 'password of the day' style encryption - it's all or nothing. For the operational requirements of the predator, nothing was better than all. They'd prefer an intermediate option, but it isn't available until procedures change.
- anigbrowl 17y agoI get that. It just seems kind of perverse to transmit in clear because scheduled encryption has risks of its own. Last time this was posted I mentioned that while interception of drone video by the Taliban or whoever is probably not that big of an operational threat, bigger strategic competitors like Russia and China have probably accrued a good lot of intelligence by amassing such data in quantity. Perhaps the NSA's thinking is that this is less critical than exposure of dynamic encryption models to the wild.
- stcredzero 17y agoLose a point for poor reading comprehension. (EDIT: Probably not comprehending muy actual proposal and knocking down your misread straw man.) Encrypt the uplink/downlink to protect it against satellite eavesdropping, worry about the distribution to users separately. Uplink/downlink video keys need to be distributed to the same folks who need the control link keys. Sorry, unless you mean something else, you are just wrong. Encrypting a video link drone->sat->base and leaving out the allies is the exact same key management problem that they are solving with the control link encryption. Basically, leave out drone->sat->allies and solve that another way.