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Intercepting Predator Video
- jacquesm 17y agoprevious coverage of this subject here: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1000464 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1000464 and here: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1002227 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1002227
- eggoa 17y agoAnd the general reaction (on Hacker News and elsewhere) was ridicule and disbelief. Schneier explains why he thinks this is naive.
- jacquesm 17y agoI think Bruce is focusing too much on the technical side of this, I think it simply never crossed the mind of those that built this thing that the 'enemy' would be technologically savvy enough to pull this off.
- pvg 17y agoI think you're focusing too much on ignoring everything that's been written on this from the original story to Bruce Schneier's commentary. Every source has reported that the military has been aware of the possibility the video feed might be intercepted by an adversary since operations in Bosnia well over a decade ago. It's basic common sense that the designers must have considered such a possibility as well - after all, they made the control link encrypted.
- jacquesm 17y agoSo far there is no proof that they considered that, if they had they would have probably evaluated the PR fallout from such a breach of security as well. Judging by how this is playing out in the media so far that does not seem to look too good for those that built this system.
- InclinedPlane 17y agoI disagree. Often it's easy for insiders to misjudge public reaction. Insiders have spent a lot of time with a system, they're perception of the system is colored by extensive debates by experts in the system and the consensus results of those debates. But outsiders lack the benefit of that debate and the context of all of the technical details and restrictions the insiders are aware of. To outsiders all of the technical options are equally trivial and outsiders don't have the time, context, or access to people with the expertise to have a serious technical conversation on the subject. In short, outsiders jump to conclusions based on their, almost certainly wrong, hasty assumptions. Insiders may not appreciate that their extensive technically detailed justifications for their current procedures are utterly useless in the face of ignorant casual public armchair analysis. Now, whether or not the experts are justified in their position is an entirely different topic, but it's quite easy to see why they may not have anticipated the PR fallout from this problem.
- jackfoxy 17y agoThe one thing I find conspicuosly lacking is comments from professionals. A quick scan of Small Wars Journal found no relevant articles or comments.
- jackfoxy 17y agoOK, dug a little deeper, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/insurgents-hack-us-drones/ http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/12/insurgents-hack-us-...
- mixmax 17y agoSchneiers argument is that encryption is not a viable option because key management would be a nightmare. The insurgents get the raw videostream by intercepting it using some sort of antenna to pick up the signal directly from the predators. Since, presumably, the military actors that need the videostream don't actually pull it out of the air themselves but get it through some kind of military channel (Internet, VPN or whatever they use) wouldn't the obvious thing to do be to encrypt the raw stream from the predators to the command post where the signal is picked up by the mlitary and distributed and send it on to whoever needs it in unencrypted form? That way the insurgents wouldn't be able to pick the signal out of the air, and everyone associated with the military who needs it would have access to it. No key management nightmare needed.
- jacquesm 17y agoRead the bit by Jeff Schroeder at the end of the comments, that pretty much deflates that whole key management argument.
- mixmax 17y agoYes, but it only applies for US troops with security clearance. As he points out guys on the ground and allies that they don't necessarily want to share crypto with can't join the game.
- jacquesm 17y agoSo, you don't want to share crypto with your allies but you do want to share your data with the enemy ?
- chollida1 17y agoPrecisly! Just as I may want to share how much money I have in the bank to a business asociate to prove I have the assest to make a deal. I'd do this by showing him/her the bank account information on screen, but I don't want to give him/her the transit, bank acount number and password to access said bank account.
- motters 17y agoBruce's points against broadcast encryption seem rather weak to me. If it was possible to distribute secret keys during WW2, surely it's also possible in 2009 - probably a great deal faster and more efficiently. If a UAV was flying over areas of the world that I know well it's highly likely that I'd be able to identify the locations that it was looking at, and send out warnings/orders accordingly. Also I could perform reconnaissance on the typical flight paths of the UAVs, and plan accordingly. Probably a major risk in the world of 24 hour news and P2P networks is the possibility of recording and later re-broadcasting closeup video of what happens when UAVs misidentify their targets and hit civilian populations. This could result in some public relations catastrophes for the UAV operators. If the military are happy for this information to be broadcast unencrypted they should also prepare themselves for said footage to appear on YouTube or TV news.
- redcap 17y agoEvery accessor needs the keys - all relevant field commanders, etc. They also need security clearances. The keys need to be stored and managed securely. They should also be updated regularly, which means that all commanders need new keys at some point. I presume the keys for each UAV would be different. In WW2 it was only a few top commanders who worked with Ultra (afaik), and it wasn't anywhere as regular as broadcast video. I guess the main difference here is the number of users is that much greater and in Schneier's opinion the value of the information is that much lesser.
- ErrantX 17y ago> If it was possible to distribute secret keys during WW2, surely it's also possible in 2009 - probably a great deal faster and more efficiently. Not really. Think how widely these keys would have to be spread to have any use. The drones are often used for immediate intervention: i.e. if needed they are launched to provide forward intelligence to units on the ground. That kind of key management is a nightmare: especially when you think other nationalities/agencies/services might require the feed instantly too. It would be a perfect setup to have encryption and key management - and I expect that technically a structure could be set up to do it securely. But one important feature of battlefields is that they get extremely confused and disorganised - it would break down at key moments, and regularly. The key to battlefield tech is always simpicity. So it's a tradeoff; one that doesn't seem to have worked out badly so far.
- stcredzero 17y agoUAVs are flown by airmen sitting at comfortable desks on U.S. military bases, where key management is simpler. But the video feed is different. It needs to be available to all sorts of people Poppycock! At least encrypt the stream going up to and coming down from the satellite! If lots of people have to see it, redistribute it afterwards. The uplink/downlink encryption is the exact same key management problem as the command signal! Hell, why not use the same key. The video signal going up to and back from the satellite is hanging out there, accessible from the majority of earth's surface. But encrypt it and beam the encrypted signal to those "comfortable military bases." Then you can re-encrypt it for distribution, and completely change the key management problem to suit your needs. (Essentially make it into two key management problems. Divide and conquer.) I usually like what Bruce has to say, but this blog post wasn't well thought out. EDIT: Upon re-reading, Bruce's point is that it's the NSA's bureaucratic requirements that make it too cumbersome for an encrypted feed to be easily made available. So it's just easier for them to leave it unencrypted. I still say poppycock. If they were really being clever, they could "leave out encryption," but still obfuscate matters. (Both from the signal standpoint and from the bureaucratic standpoint.) Even something like a "new compression algorithm" would probably be enough to flummox the Russian software program. If it were unique to the drones, then the sat-download program authors would have no economic incentive to implement it. (And some "representatives" of our interests could have talks with them about it if they happen to implement it anyway.) This isn't strong crypto, but it would at least raise the bar. EDIT: To those with poor reading comprehension: the tactic is a bit of "divide and conquer." (Colloquially, not algorithmically.) Divide the "key management" problem into two: "Sat up/down link" and "distribute to allies." The "Sat up/down link" is the exact same key management problem as for the control link. Also, if you solve that key management problem by just using obscure compression, then you can distribute the video using ordinary website access controls on establishing streams. Not strong crypto, not uber-secure, but still better than what's there now.
- mbenjaminsmith 17y agoExactly. These drones (or similar drones) are able to fire laser or radio guided missiles. I can't believe fire command and control of the drones isn't handled with 'hardcore' security of some kind. But it was too hard to encrypt a video feed? I don't buy it.
- rg 17y agoFTA: "The problem is, the world has changed. Today's insurgent adversaries don't have KGB-level intelligence gathering or cryptanalytic capabilities. At the same time, computer and network data gathering has become much cheaper and easier, so they have technical capabilities the Soviets could only dream of. Defending against these sorts of adversaries doesn't require military-grade encryption only where it counts; it requires commercial-grade encryption everywhere possible."
- waivej 17y agoOk, maybe they didn't intend it, but what about the psychological warfare side of it? Didn't whistling WWII bombs further scare the folks on the ground? Today's wars are more psychological than ever. The enemy probably watches and gets scared by video of their locations being watched and blown up. They might even think twice after seeing things from our perspective.
- fragmede 17y agoOr maybe they even did. Video really goes out over an encrypted link, and this is a setup. Maybe they have a good way to track the hardware needed? Maybe wait for the insurgents to noticeably use this technique, then midnight UAV runs with the unencrypted satellite feed disabled can go on unnoticed for longer. Hell, use this to feed false data so that instead of insurgents running out of a building just about to be bombed, they run right into a squad waiting to capture them. There are also a spook-side theories. This could be a subtle poke in the ribs to say the insurgents could be doing this, and General Atomics embarrassed itself into a needed round of funding.
- waivej 17y agoYeah, that's cool. It's like the movie "Sleep Dealer". They looked for someone watching a feed and dropped a bomb on his house.
- gills 17y agoWhy the feeds are unencrypted is irrelevant, as are all the statements about how easy or hard it should have been to "do it right." The only relevant issue is "what effect does the compromise have on the usefulness of the intelligence gathered by the UAV?" For a variety of reasons I would say this causes only a very small amount of degradation in the usefulness or lifespan of the intelligence. Do I think it should be fixed? Yeah. Do I think it's the most life-saving use of engineering resources? No. Do I think all the arm-waving is going to cost more than the solution? Definitely.