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The battle between Washington and Silicon Valley over encryption
- georgebarnett 11y agoIt's seems to me that the inevitable response to back doors will be similar to what has happened following the NSA leaks - secint, sysadmins and devs will update their threat model, excluding the known defective components from the system. In trying to gain deeper access, I believe the government will only lock themselves out further. Either that or it's a noisy ruse. Make lots of noise about how you're going to backdoor things. Have a great debate and declare it a dead idea, then do it secretly.
- mhurron 11y ago> excluding the known defective components from the system The problem is, eventually everything legally allowed to be sold in the US would fall under the definition of defective.
- georgebarnett 11y agoThat's absolutely an issue and I'm wondering how it will shake out. Whatever happens, if this goes ahead it will be a massive opportunity for non-US players.
- marktangotango 11y agoThis is a really good article, balanced and well informed. Is this typical for the csmonitor? >> Have a great debate and declare it a dead idea, then do it secretly. Or, putting on my tinfoil hat, they already have means to break arbitrary encryption and they just want back doors (public or in secret) to provide plausible deniability of that fact. An important aspect about having an exceptional capability is not revealing you have that capability.
- venomsnake 11y agoAsymmetrical-would not be surprised. Symmetrical - i doubt. OTB symmetric key exchange will still provide good security.
- surge 11y agocsmonitor puts out surprisingly good well researched articles that compared to other online outlets, aren't rushed to press or are well researched in depth pieces that you simply don't find on many other sites (except maybe Vice or the Atlantic) on occasion.
- afarrell 11y ago> to provide plausible deniability of that fact Or to provide deterrence to criminal conspiracies without admitting that fact.
- adwf 11y agoNot mentioned in the article is how to deal with the encroachment of backdoors worldwide. If we allow the US to have a backdoor, we've allowed the principle of backdoors in general. What's stopping the UK asking for its set of keys? Still OK? They're allies after all. Where does it get uncomfortable for people? France? India? Israel? Saudi Arabia? China? Once the principle is there for it to be done technologically, businesses will be faced with the choice of allowing multiple backdoors or not doing business in those countries at all. And if you do accept all these backdoors, now you've got dozens of potential security holes. Not to mention you have absolutely no guarantee that any of these countries are genuinely going to decrypt just for "national security". Giving their native companies access to your corporate data would be a huge boon.
- colin_jack 11y agoThat is actually mentioned in the article.
- anonymousDan 11y agoIntel SGX could be this backdoor. Just have Intel hand over the key for each device to the Government and job done.
- pmontra 11y agoSome analysis of SGX: https://www.virusbtn.com/virusbulletin/archive/2014/01/vb201401-SGX https://www.virusbtn.com/virusbulletin/archive/2014/01/vb201...
- mike_hearn 11y agoOnly for programs that use SGX remote attestation. Which is at the present time zero programs. Additionally, it's not clear why you'd need it to do local encryption of your own data.
- anonymousDan 11y agoHuh? It's not even available yet, so of course there aren't any programs using SGX remote attestation. Regarding your second point, one of the main use cases is likely to be the cloud computing market where you want to do remote computation over sensitive data (requiring it to be decrypted inside an enclave). If an attacker knows the machine's built in key then it can read any encrypted pages. Or maybe I'm misunderstanding your comment?
- omouse 11y agoSo it's like the early 90s where they want to weaken encryption and make industrial espionage easier?
- joesmo 11y agoAnyone that buys the argument that we need back doors for encryption to stop crime is an idiot. Crimes were solved before cell phones even existed, proving that backdoors into software are not needed to solve crimes. I'm sure the administration knows better, but they also know how weak most Americans' minds are when it comes to understanding the consequences of national policies. The fact that this is a debate is ridiculous, but not unexpected in the US. Damn straight it will hurt tech companies, as it should. They should go out of business until they move or their government stops fucking them over, ideally the latter, and the government should be held accountable. We're not talking about mom 'n pop shops here, we're talking about some of the richest companies on earth here. They can lobby for the government to subsidize their losses. They can lobby directly against any legislation proposed. If they're unsuccessful, they pretty much have only themselves to blame, after all their money is what moves politicians, not the other way around.
- rayiner 11y ago> Anyone that buys the argument that we need back doors for encryption to stop crime is an idiot. Crimes were solved before cell phones even existed, proving that backdoors into software are not needed to solve crimes. I don't support requiring back-doors, but it's pretty ironic that you call people idiots then immediately follow that with a totally fallacious assertion. Law enforcement didn't have back-doors into cell phones before those existed, but criminals also didn't have secure ways to communicate over distance in real time. We can't conclude anything from the fact that crimes were still solved before cell phones existed. The other way to look at it is to ask: out of the universe of ways for people to communicate, what can the government get at with a warrant? Historically, the answer was: nearly everything. For most of the last century, there was no way to communicate over distance that the government couldn't intercept. The only real-time way to communicate over distance was phone, and they've always had a "back door" to the PSTN through wire taps. Think about it: why do mob bosses in old movies take the risk of meeting at shady restaurants, instead of just dialing into a conference number? Because their phones are all tapped! Law enforcement's position is that back doors just maintain that long-standing status quo. It may be a bad idea because security should outweigh the needs of law enforcement, but it's not an irrational argument.
- exabrial 11y agoyawn. This is really overhyped
- rm_-rf_slash 11y agoMy problem with intentional vulnerabilities is this: if we (Americans) supposedly have the best and baddest intelligence agencies in the world, isn't asking for a key under the doormat akin to a magician asking the crowd to close their eyes while they get their next trick ready? If the FBI and NSA really need backdoors to do their job, then it makes me feel less secure...and less trusting.
- mindslight 11y agoRekindling this government desire was an easily forseeable result of centralization. "Web 2.0" companies are inherently surveillance companies, and their motives are directly aligned with government. They are putting on a good show to avoid alienating their targetbase. But even if it were in their interests to adopt end to end encryption, they are in no position to stand up to the government the way a bunch of distributed software users would be. We won the war in the 90's, just to have to fight it all over again because lazy people adopted webcrapps.
- erikpukinskis 11y agoWe're in a weird time. I just read the writeup about moot's challenges moderating 4chan. But we will soon have an unmoderatable "crypto 4chan" built on blockchain technology that mechanically cannot be censored. Ethereum, Maidsafe, et al are building the infrastructure right now. Government officials are concerned about this direction, as they should be. We will soon start seeing crypto-murder software that cannot be censored. Imagine Bitcoin, except instead of mining, you get paid to cache weaponized drones in remote locations so that they can do the blockchain's bidding. These are not science fiction fantasies, the infrastructure for this is planned to be completed within the next few years. We can laugh at congress for thinking there is some obvious way for them to backdoor PGP, but they have good reasons to be concerned. You might argue that this is a separate issue from the simple cryptography issue that congress is debating. But in my mind they are parts of the emerging phenomenon of information tools which are impervious to physical violence. For the state, which derives its power from physical violence, the entire movement is an existential threat. I'm actually more concerned about this issue than the whole "AI superthreat". The kinds of tools the AIs would use to harm us will already be in the hands of bad people, long before the AIs wake up. I am in no way suggesting these technologies are bad. People are already dying because they don't have access to food, shelter, and healthcare, and I belive crypto-technologies will save far more lives that way—providing universal logistics support to all humans—than they will facilitate deaths. But so far IT has been sufficiently insulated from the physical world that technology feels somewhat safe... A long weekend in Vegas with fun games and a lot of money to be made. No one is really dying because pets.com went awry. But that is changing. Robotics combined with blockchain technologies enable information systems that are very much "of the world" and yet are not subject to the same mechanics of control as humans are, due to them not needing food or physical safety. That's not a smal change, it's a huge one. Sometimes I wonder if this jump won't set us temporarily back towards a more totalitarian state. The obvious solution is to ban robotics and crypto, with a censorship regime like China has. I don't know how many "bad robots" or "bad blockchains" would need to exist for that scenario to trigger with wide public support. I honestly spend most of my time trying to solve problems with these technologies so I haven't spent much time thinking about harm mitigation strategies. But I don't think it's silly to have that conversation. And we should help congress to have the right conversation, not mock them for failing to understand a problem that, frankly, none of us really understands.
- bigmofo 11y agoEvery OS gets software updates to patch various security issues every few weeks or month or so. There is absolutely no reason why the NSA or FBI can't have a warrant saying that the person that they want to tap gets government spy ware on it via an update. Also, I have to assume that every OS has security vulnerabilities that are not known to the public. If so, those can be used. Also, I remember reading some story about something like Intel IPMI being used to read arbitrary memory remotely regardless of OS installed. I think that there are far too many security holes for an agency with tons of employees and money to not be able to exploit. How many mathematicians and cryptographers does the NSA employ? I think that there is only one full time person working on GNU Privacy Guard. I don't really see any information stored on a phone as safe. I would think that the manufacturer, the OS writer and the ISP can probably patch the phone, which can come with government spy ware. I have no doubt that if if they want to target somebody that they can do it. I think that is just a bunch of publicity to make the general public think that they are weak and impotent. Also, consider the fact that it has been reported that the government uses parallel construction to hide where the evidence really originated...