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unclear if its a witch hunt or if Krebs wants to be on record with his reasoning in order to secure some of that $500K bounty if it turns out to be this guy? I
by ChuckMcM 11y ago
unclear if its a witch hunt or if Krebs wants to be on record with his reasoning in order to secure some of that $500K bounty if it turns out to be this guy?
I've never figured out how they actually decide who gets what if they have to split that up.
- lawl 11y agoHe could have not posted the twitter handle but a hash instead? echo "The Twitter handle Brian Krebs anonymized in this blog post is..." | sha256sum There you go, you can prove it to anyone at any point in time.
- dougk16 11y agoNot familiar with Twitter, but if you can easily get all or most handles through their API or scraping then wouldn't it be easy to brute-force reverse the hash? Edit: Maybe add a private salt? Edit again: Oh, missed that "The Twitter handle Brian Krebs..." is effectively the private salt, nevermind.
- slig 11y agoProbably one should do something similar to this: echo "The Twitter handle Brian Krebs anonymized in this blog post is @user and this a random salt qF7KKAUxtrEtQbnj4LPkUZM4." | sha256sum
- biot 11y agoThe inclusion of a salt only protects against precomputed hashes. It makes almost no difference to how many millions of hashes one can perform per second.
- Ded7xSEoPKYNsDd 11y agoI think the idea is not to publicize the salt. The proof still works (after both user name and salt are publicly known), but a dictionary attack with all twitter handles won't work.
- zaroth 11y agoExactly. If you publish just the digest of "HMAC(salt,handle)" and want to find a new salt in order to fill in a different twitter handle but with the same digest, this is called a pre-image attack -- finding a message with a specific hash value, with a time complexity of 2^n.
- vonklaus 11y agothen he could not provide evidence the handle and hack were connected. He would either need to provide enough relevant information for a reader to independently discover that Zu was the correct twitter handle, or leave out enough info that it wouldn't be convincing.
- gvb 11y agoI'm pretty sure Krebs is in the game for the publicity, not the reward money. The publicity and "staying relevant" as a security researcher has a lot more value than a nebulous reward that likely will never pay out. Based on the typical wording when reward money is offered, I strongly suspect almost no reward money is ever paid out. It typically requires arrest and prosecution (often conviction) and there are plenty of opportunities for the lawyers to say "sorry, your tip did not qualify" even if someone is arrested and prosecuted. I did not find a direct offer, but Wired has a quote[1] (most sources don't even provide a quote!): “Today I can confirm that Avid Life Media is offering a $500,000 reward to anyone providing information that leads to the identification, arrest and prosecution of the person or persons responsible for the leak of the Ashley Madison database,” Evans said, according to the BBC. [1] http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-offering-500k-reward-info-hackers/ http://www.wired.com/2015/08/ashley-madison-offering-500k-re... Update: Odd. The BBC link in the Wired story has quotes from "Bryce Evans of the Toronto police", but does not have the offer of a reward quote that Wired quotes. http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34044506