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Q: Why should we care about this? Why not deal with it when quantum computers finally start cracking existing crypto? A: 1. It takes time to implement new me

by beloch 11y ago

Q: Why should we care about this? Why not deal with it when quantum computers finally start cracking existing crypto? A: 1. It takes time to implement new methods. Would it be acceptable for there to be a period of months or years during which we can't make credit card transactions, etc.? 2. Coded text of messages encoded using conventional cryptographic methods can be intercepted, archived and then broken at a later date. If you make a purchase today, somebody archives the coded exchange, and a quantum computer capable of cracking the encryption used in that exchange becomes available before your credit card expires, you've got a problem. You've got an even bigger problem if you transmit information that remains sensitive for longer than your credit card info. As a general rule, don't use conventional encryption methods to transmit information with long-term sensitivity (e.g. medical records, etc.).

tedunangst 11y ago
> As a general rule, don't use conventional encryption methods to transmit information with long-term sensitivity (e.g. medical records, etc.). So what do you suggest I use today, given that I have a medical record here and I need it over there?
- altcognito 11y ago
  One time pads sent via some secure service is about all I can come up with. This works provided you know who you are going to talk to and don't suddenly run out of "pad". Sounds like an awful business model. I'm sure some consultancy could sell it though.
  - darkmighty 11y ago
    Post-quantum crypto already exists afaik, the only issue is performance and key sizes (I guess this supposes the of quantum difficulty of certain problems).
    - wbl 11y ago
      It's not enough to have an algorithm. You need to get down to "what do these bytes mean" and "what exactly do I do with them" and have that be implemented. It's a considerably more painful process than you might think if you haven't been exposed to IETF things.
  - tedunangst 11y ago
    One time pads offer zero integrity/authentication. They are "malleable".
  - gubberdump 11y ago
    One time pads are not secure against "beyond-time" tactics or attacks. Also, all alphanumeric combinations have been generated.
- DanielDent 11y ago
  My current, somewhat underinformed understanding: (A) Handling key exchange (Diffie-Hellmman) is ugly. There are other algorithms, but I'm unclear what a good choice is right now. I'm also unclear if larger key sizes are actually helpful. (B) For symmetric algorithms, AES, use AES-256. In the quantum case, it might be equivalent to ~127-128 bit AES, which is pretty decent. (C) For hashing, use SHA-512. It uses 64-bit words, and might be similar in strength to SHA-256 today. (D) A lot of hash algorithms can actually be used as signature schemes, especially if you combine them with Merkle tree like structures.
- deleted 11y ago
  [deleted]
- ams6110 11y ago
  Fax machine
  - Spooky23 11y ago
    Several years ago, I was asked to intervene in an argument with a institution handling extremely sensitive information that needed to be transmitted en masse. The receiving party received the data on physical media in the mail, but refused to access it, as the tool used to encrypt the data wasn't validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 2. (It was a reasonably good commercial product, and had Level 1 validation, and the folks negotiating this had no clue what that meant anyway) Why did that matter? Who the hell knows. Their counter proposal was that something like 2,000 pages of whatever would be securely transmitted via Fax. The punchline is that the stuff ended up getting re-shipped in paper form via Fedex Same-Day, securely nestled in a big pelican case secured with zip ties and a $30 padlock. Everyone shook their heads, except for the poor secretary facing sending 2,000 pages through a fax machine :)
- Hoff 11y ago
  Most recent NSA transitional recommendations are for 3072-bit asymmetric, and AES-256 symmetric. Details: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.sh... For network transfers, you'll likely also want to select your encryption with PFS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy
  - periodontal 11y ago
    PFS will make it so connections need to be individually attacked but since most PFS is done with Diffie-Hellman variants (susceptible to Shor's algorithm), the group size also needs to be large enough to resist early quantum computers. For defense against large quantum computers, different PFS schemes need to be used (fortunately not hard to construct from other post quantum primitives).
dogma1138 11y ago
Most credit card transactions are atill point of sale which usually uses symmetric encryption so quantum computing doesn't play a role. Also if tomorrow some one makes a quantum computer which can say break 2048bit RSA easily it won't break the world. A state actor with a trillion dollar machine won't care about your credit card. And this won't change quickly quantum computing will be very expensive for decades to come. And moving to symmetric encryption with key exchange instead of classical PKI is always an option. As a general rule using anything but conventional encryption is a sure way of having your encryption broken unless you are a world grade cryptographer with 50 world grade friends that can audit your system.

by beloch 11y ago

tedunangst 11y ago

> As a general rule, don't use conventional encryption methods to transmit information with long-term sensitivity (e.g. medical records, etc.). So what do you suggest I use today, given that I have a medical record here and I need it over there?

altcognito 11y ago
One time pads sent via some secure service is about all I can come up with. This works provided you know who you are going to talk to and don't suddenly run out of "pad". Sounds like an awful business model. I'm sure some consultancy could sell it though.
- darkmighty 11y ago
  Post-quantum crypto already exists afaik, the only issue is performance and key sizes (I guess this supposes the of quantum difficulty of certain problems).
  - wbl 11y ago
    It's not enough to have an algorithm. You need to get down to "what do these bytes mean" and "what exactly do I do with them" and have that be implemented. It's a considerably more painful process than you might think if you haven't been exposed to IETF things.
- tedunangst 11y ago
  One time pads offer zero integrity/authentication. They are "malleable".
- gubberdump 11y ago
  One time pads are not secure against "beyond-time" tactics or attacks. Also, all alphanumeric combinations have been generated.
DanielDent 11y ago
My current, somewhat underinformed understanding: (A) Handling key exchange (Diffie-Hellmman) is ugly. There are other algorithms, but I'm unclear what a good choice is right now. I'm also unclear if larger key sizes are actually helpful. (B) For symmetric algorithms, AES, use AES-256. In the quantum case, it might be equivalent to ~127-128 bit AES, which is pretty decent. (C) For hashing, use SHA-512. It uses 64-bit words, and might be similar in strength to SHA-256 today. (D) A lot of hash algorithms can actually be used as signature schemes, especially if you combine them with Merkle tree like structures.
deleted 11y ago
[deleted]
ams6110 11y ago
Fax machine
- Spooky23 11y ago
  Several years ago, I was asked to intervene in an argument with a institution handling extremely sensitive information that needed to be transmitted en masse. The receiving party received the data on physical media in the mail, but refused to access it, as the tool used to encrypt the data wasn't validated to FIPS 140-2 Level 2. (It was a reasonably good commercial product, and had Level 1 validation, and the folks negotiating this had no clue what that meant anyway) Why did that matter? Who the hell knows. Their counter proposal was that something like 2,000 pages of whatever would be securely transmitted via Fax. The punchline is that the stuff ended up getting re-shipped in paper form via Fedex Same-Day, securely nestled in a big pelican case secured with zip ties and a $30 padlock. Everyone shook their heads, except for the poor secretary facing sending 2,000 pages through a fax machine :)
Hoff 11y ago
Most recent NSA transitional recommendations are for 3072-bit asymmetric, and AES-256 symmetric. Details: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.sh... For network transfers, you'll likely also want to select your encryption with PFS: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy
- periodontal 11y ago
  PFS will make it so connections need to be individually attacked but since most PFS is done with Diffie-Hellman variants (susceptible to Shor's algorithm), the group size also needs to be large enough to resist early quantum computers. For defense against large quantum computers, different PFS schemes need to be used (fortunately not hard to construct from other post quantum primitives).

dogma1138 11y ago

Most credit card transactions are atill point of sale which usually uses symmetric encryption so quantum computing doesn't play a role. Also if tomorrow some one makes a quantum computer which can say break 2048bit RSA easily it won't break the world. A state actor with a trillion dollar machine won't care about your credit card. And this won't change quickly quantum computing will be very expensive for decades to come. And moving to symmetric encryption with key exchange instead of classical PKI is always an option. As a general rule using anything but conventional encryption is a sure way of having your encryption broken unless you are a world grade cryptographer with 50 world grade friends that can audit your system.