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You're also up against hardware hackers who stand to make a buck selling prepackaged hardware exploits (AKA modchips). You'd be surprised how much resources th
by monocasa 11y ago
You're also up against hardware hackers who stand to make a buck selling prepackaged hardware exploits (AKA modchips). You'd be surprised how much resources these guys have available to them.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoI wouldn't be. They're quite clever. And mod-chips are a physical attack. All systems are assumed compromised if enemy has physical possession, especially modifications. How well are they currently doing with remote, software attacks to fully compromise the gaming consoles?
- monocasa 11y agoWell, they don't really care about software attacks as much since those don't make them as much money. It's also fairly difficult for a remote hack because everything leaving the console has to go through an IPSEC tunnel to pass cert (at least on the 360). And you'd be surprised how secure you can get a game console these days from a hardware perspective. For instance, on the 360, all stacks and everything in the hypervisor is encrypted with a per boot random key and hashed as it leaves L2 for main memory. If the hash doesn't match on the way back, the system resets. You're very protected from DMA attacks. Particularly of the kind that that's easily reproducible and able to be sold in mass.
- nickpsecurity 11y agoThe console security was good work. They wisely applied the tech being developed by academics and industry. There's a number of similar tech designed to stop leaks, protect control flow, and so on with crypto in SOC. I can dig up and post some of you'd like.
- monocasa 11y agoYeah, I'd love to read that if it's not too much effort. : )
- nickpsecurity 11y agoFirst that was easier than AEGIS was SP/Bastion: http://palms.ee.princeton.edu/sp_bastion http://palms.ee.princeton.edu/sp_bastion SecureME's cloaking was interesting: https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1i_Zf52vJctMTA4YTI1MmUtNzdjNC00ZDRmLTlhYTItYjM0YjhlNGE2MzUz/edit?hl=en&pli=1 https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B1i_Zf52vJctMTA4YTI1MmUtNzdj... HIDE - an infrastructure for efficiently protecting information leakage on the address bus http://www.cc.gatech.edu/people/home/santosh/papers/asplos2004.pdf http://www.cc.gatech.edu/people/home/santosh/papers/asplos20... Using address independent seed encryption and bonsai Merkle Trees to make secure processors OS- and performance-friendly http://www.ece.ncsu.edu/arpers/Papers/micro07-brian.pdf http://www.ece.ncsu.edu/arpers/Papers/micro07-brian.pdf Embedded Software Security through Key-Based Control Flow Obfuscation http://engr.case.edu/bhunia_swarup/papers/C/C80.pdf http://engr.case.edu/bhunia_swarup/papers/C/C80.pdf Memory encryption: Survey of Existing Techniques http://www.thayer.dartmouth.edu/tr/reports/tr13-001.pdf http://www.thayer.dartmouth.edu/tr/reports/tr13-001.pdf ASIST - architecture support for instruction set randomization http://www.ics.forth.gr/_publications/papadog-asist-ccs.pdf http://www.ics.forth.gr/_publications/papadog-asist-ccs.pdf Hardware architectures for software security http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-204811/unrestricted/edmison_joshua_dissertation.pdf http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-10112006-2048...