I'm not sure this is practical. Caveats: I have only read the paper while sleepy, and I'm worried that I'm breaching our negativity rules with my attack, but I'

I'm not sure this is practical. Caveats: I have only read the paper while sleepy, and I'm worried that I'm breaching our negativity rules with my attack, but I'll proceed: I propose the following attack on the protocol. Bisect North and South America with a 'no go zone' for packets -- we can't live with a packet hitting Omaha, for a variety of reasons. I propose that there exists no safe "alibi" route from SF to NY. Any crooked peer can route into the dreaded Omaha and to a crooked NY peer faster than any safe route can go west through Asia. A crooked peer can forge sequential MACs showing a 'legitimate' looking route easily. So, I would reformulate the claims to "If a packet is never routed to an attacker that can route through a forbidden zone more quickly than obeying the restrictions, there is a valid alibi routing." It's hard to come up with a good use case for this protocol, in my mind. Especially because we are most often concerned with packet routing at the destination and source, and for legal reasons, not inspection reasons. It's largely understood by anyone who might possibly be using alibi routing that packets are often inspected in flight, and there is nothing you can do about it, and that furthermore the concepts of safe or unsafe nations or regions or cities are almost laughable when it comes to even the smallest nation state's avaricious desire for inspection and storage of data flying by.