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The machine may not print a log in order. i.e. the attack scenario is a small town, where you record each person as they come in. Then later you can look at th
by ars 11y ago
The machine may not print a log in order.
i.e. the attack scenario is a small town, where you record each person as they come in. Then later you can look at the vote in order and know who voted what.
> Presumably the forces doing the coercion wouldn't have access to the audit tape.
That is not a valid assumption. Your machine must be resistant even to that attack.
> If they did, then we're already screwed no matter what system we implement.
No. The audit must not be able to be correlated with the person, the order, or the time.
- function_seven 11y agoSo basically the response to my last sentence: > Not sure if there's some fundamental contradiction between secrecy in voting and voter-auditability. Is, "yes, there is"? By "voter-auditability" I mean the ability for any single person to verify that their ballot was cast the same way they intended.
- reagency 11y ago"zero knowledge proofs" is a textbook solved problem. Your local college library has books that explain how to do secure voting. It is how AWS and HTTPS works.