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No identifying info needs to be printed. Just a GUID. Use a dot matrix printer with triplicate ("biplicate"?), let the voter take their receipt, and keep the ot
by function_seven 11y ago
No identifying info needs to be printed. Just a GUID. Use a dot matrix printer with triplicate ("biplicate"?), let the voter take their receipt, and keep the other one on the spool.
Yeah, there's still might be some issue with external coercion on the voter to produce their receipt and prove they voted the way they were paid to. I suppose that could be solved by making the voter's copy an XOR of the audit tape, and by only having both copies together, can the vote be verified. Presumably the forces doing the coercion wouldn't have access to the audit tape. If they did, then we're already screwed no matter what system we implement.
Just a thought. Not sure if there's some fundamental contradiction between secrecy in voting and voter-auditability.
- spc476 11y agoWhy not print out N copies of the receipt, where N = number of parties (usually 2 in the US, Republicans and Democrats). Then, each receipt is placed in a box dedicated to each party. Then, representatives from each party get a box, and count receipts. All count should match (or be within a certain margin), right?
- vidarh 11y agoThat might work in the US, but elsewhere it's not uncommon for 10+ parties to contest an election.
- ars 11y agoThe machine may not print a log in order. i.e. the attack scenario is a small town, where you record each person as they come in. Then later you can look at the vote in order and know who voted what. > Presumably the forces doing the coercion wouldn't have access to the audit tape. That is not a valid assumption. Your machine must be resistant even to that attack. > If they did, then we're already screwed no matter what system we implement. No. The audit must not be able to be correlated with the person, the order, or the time.
- function_seven 11y agoSo basically the response to my last sentence: > Not sure if there's some fundamental contradiction between secrecy in voting and voter-auditability. Is, "yes, there is"? By "voter-auditability" I mean the ability for any single person to verify that their ballot was cast the same way they intended.
- reagency 11y ago"zero knowledge proofs" is a textbook solved problem. Your local college library has books that explain how to do secure voting. It is how AWS and HTTPS works.
- spacehome 11y ago> biplicate We just say 'duplicate'.
- function_seven 11y agoI..., uh, this is embarrassing. :)