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This argument is a general argument for is irresponsible disclosure of 0-days. You don't need omnicience to determine whether the downsides outweigh the potent

• mikeash 11y ago
  Malware that uses this exploit to cause damage is a straight up attack on users. Merely revealing a vulnerability isn't an attack. The vulnerability was there all along, and there's no guarantee that this person is the only one who could find it, or even the first. I'm all for responsible disclosure. But I think we need to clarify good and bad here. Responsible disclosure is better than just announcing findings to the world, but telling people about what you've discovered is not bad.
  • MagerValp 11y ago
    There's writing a nicely worded letter, and sending it in a rose scented envelope. And then there's scribbling a note, tying it to a rock, and throwing it through the window. Telling the world via a fully working exploit causes a ton of collateral damage, and the author made no effort at all to reduce the impact. Waiting for 10.10.5 and releasing it on a Saturday afternoon makes it seem like the point was to cause as big a mess as possible.
    • mikeash 11y ago
      Maybe Saturday afternoon just happened to be when he finished. And no, it's not like throwing a rock through somebody's window. The information may be used by other people to cause damage, but the mere act of releasing it is not by itself damaging. Let's put blame where it belongs: on the people actually using exploits for bad purposes. If you want to encourage responsible disclosure, don't lead with bad analogies about what happens when you announce a vulnerability to the world, because it just reduces your credibility.
      • qwertyoruiop 11y ago
        for the record: i had no idea yesterday was saturday at the time I dropped the code.
        • mikeash 11y ago
          Nothing says "hardcore hacker at work" quite like forgetting what day of the week it is.
          • gress 11y ago
            Nothing says 'irresponsible' like not thinking at all about the impact of releasing information you know people will use for harm. Publishing to github comes after the hacking. If qwertyoruiop had instead come up with plans for making a suitcase nuke from household ingredients, or for breeding an Ebola analog using a home beer making kit, your argument would imply that you think that posting them on the Internet would not be bad. I disagree.
            • mikeash 11y ago
              And again with the ridiculous analogies. It's really difficult to have a serious discussion about computer security vulnerabilities when people keep comparing it to throwing rocks through windows or weapons of mass destruction. And yes, it's relevant, because the severity of a problem can and does influence how problematic various approaches are. This is a local root exploit. Those are common and not generally problematic. The barrier to escalating from a normal user to root is at best the absolute last line of defense, and often completely irrelevant. It's a problem that should be fixed, don't get me wrong, but the severity is about 2 out of 10. The fact that I think it's not a bad thing to release information like this has no bearing on what I would think about releasing information on building a suitcase nuke from household ingredients. Could we try to keep the conversation grounded, here?
              • gress 11y ago
                If you had been saying before now that this wasn't a severe bug and so we shouldn't be too concerned about disclosure, then you wouldn't have been presented with these strong counterarguments. But that isn't what you've been saying - rather, you've been making the general argument that releasing information is not damaging or bad, and that we should only hold the people who exploit vulnerabilities responsible - not those who disclose them. Multiple people have argued against you on this. Now you have switched your position to 'It's not bad to disclose vulnerabilities unless they are severe'. This seems much more reasonable, and came as the consequence of you being presented with what you are calling 'ridiculous' analogies. To me this seems like a serious discussion done right.
    • qwertyoruiop 11y ago
      > and the author made no effort at all to reduce the impact http://github.com/kpwn/NULLGuard http://github.com/kpwn/NULLGuard
      • MagerValp 11y ago
        Thank you. Any particular reason you decided to lead with the exploit and not this patch?
        • qwertyoruiop 11y ago
          I did not have the patch ready when the exploit was published, that's the only reason why. I had my reasons to publish the exploit in public yesterday, but all I can say is "no comment". Just for the record: I did inform Apple beforehand. Not so much before, but before. I do not consider this to be their fault in any way as someone in this thread seems to be implying. Again, I had my reasons to drop such a thing publicly. I've had this for months, and I did not intend on disclosing at all. Proof of my "for months" assertion: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8arPid8GtFk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8arPid8GtFk > As a bare minimum Apple needs a few hours to analyze the bug Again, for the record: Apple has full details of the underlying bug. They won't even need to check my github at all.
          • scintill76 11y ago
            The video mentions iOS being vulnerable (around 1:00), but the exploit doesn't mention it. How vulnerable is iOS?
            • qwertyoruiop 11y ago
              iOS is vulnerable too as far as the vulnerability is concerned. It is not directly exploitable on iOS, however having a NULL task_t still does give you some abilities, even if not (directly?) SVC code exec.
          • MagerValp 11y ago
            That restores some of my faith in humanity, thank you. We'll be looking at the kext today at work, but due to Apple's kext signing requirements I don't know how feasible it is to roll it out.
  • gress 11y ago
    Telling people about what you have discovered is bad if you can reasonably tell that those people are bad actors who will use the information you are giving them to do harm. That's why it's responsible to tell the people who can be responsible for mitigating the problem in sufficient time for them to propagate a fix before publicizing the exploit in the knowledge that you are giving it to bad actors. The fact that the vulnerability existed before and may have even been being exploited does absolutely nothing to change this. If it was already being exploited but isn't publicly known then irresponsible disclosure simly makes the problem worse by increasing its availability to more bad actors who weren't previously in the know.
• scintill76 11y ago
  > You don't need omnicience to determine whether the downsides outweigh the potential benefits I mean you'd have to be omniscient to make the optimal choice with absolute certainty. What if somebody with the most sensitive data you can imagine, gets infected and the data exfiltrated if they have to wait for Apple to patch this, but is safe after applying one of the suggested fixes from the exploiter? If you were omniscient you could tally up the total harm (or whatever metric you want to use) from various choices and choose the best one. I recognize the mainstream-accepted calculus is more along the lines you are arguing for, and of course it makes sense to use probabilities and percentages since nobody's omniscient. But, given we don't know who else had this exploit, I still see some value in rapidly securing a few people rather than letting them remain vulnerable.
  • gress 11y ago
    Your argument that you'd have to be omniscient to make the optimal choice with absolute certainty is true of all human decision making at all times, and therefore doesn't change the argument at all. You say 'given that we don't know who else had this exploit' there is value in rapidly securing a few people rather than letting them remain vulnerable. The question here is has the public availability of the exploit secured more users from realistic attack than it has exposed? The fact that the vulnerability wasn't publicly known before is evidence that it wasn't in widespread use. Not conclusive evidence, but evidence nonetheless. Not knowing who had the exploit before doesn't mean we have no information on which to base the decision, and certainly doesn't mean we should adopt a policy based on the idea that the exploit is currently in widespread use.
    • scintill76 11y ago
      You are right that my argument is sort of philosophical and not practical. > The question here is has the public availability of the exploit secured more users from realistic attack than it has exposed? It probably has exposed more. But, it could depend on whether some OS X servers were patched, or company-managed OS X workstations, or virus-scanner definitions updated, which could simultaneously protect many users. > certainly doesn't mean we should adopt a policy based on the idea that the exploit is currently in widespread use. In the current climate, I'm not so sure. Maybe not "widespread" use since, as you say, it doesn't seem to be publicly known. But, if it were only in narrow use and the discloser has determined this was the fastest way to warn people, do those narrow victims deserve security less than everyone else? Some of the discloser's statements make me wonder if he does know of other exploiters. You can question whether he knows enough or has the right to make that call, but if he disclosed responsibly, you'd be trusting Apple in the same way. Are they inherently more capable of making a good decision just because they're a corp? P.S. It's interesting that you seem to rely on "the community" to notice whether this was being exploited by malware, but are mad at somebody from "the community" reporting it without it having been exploited by malware. Of course I understand the reason this may not be the best way for it to be reported, but maybe we should be glad this was found and reported at all, for free, by someone in "the community." It almost seems entitled, to expect someone else to do you a favor for free, and for you to also dictate the terms.