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> In GPG's model a MITM or malicious mirror can serve you old, known vulnerable content that you'll accept as valid because the signatures verify. This presume
by kordless 11y ago
> In GPG's model a MITM or malicious mirror can serve you old, known vulnerable content that you'll accept as valid because the signatures verify.
This presumes you use HTTP, have a compromised SSL cert, or have pissed off the NSA. At the worst one would be installing older packages with known vulnerabilities via a replay attack, not a fresh code injection by the attacker. This is more the fault of the package manager running over HTTP than GPG, as far as I can see.
Here's a paper covering 'survivable key compromise' by the same chaps: http://freehaven.net/~arma/tuf-ccs2010.pdf http://freehaven.net/~arma/tuf-ccs2010.pdf. Interesting stuff.
- dmcgowan 11y ago> This presumes you use HTTP, have a compromised SSL cert, or have pissed off the NSA. This is not taking into content mirroring. TUF allows you to treat all mirrors as potentially malicious allowing anyone to reliably deliver trusted content, even in an untrusted network. GPG does not provide a way to detect active attacks other than signature verification.
- kordless 11y agoThis is still an apples to oranges argument. GPG is a way to sign data in a trusted manner, including data that is delivered by both trusted and untrusted systems. If you want to point fingers, point at APT, YUM or RPM, not GPG.