2 ms·

This is a silly argument. 1. Assume false. 2. Anything follows. For what odd-ball definition of "far reaching" is "anything" not "far reaching"? An assumptio

by nmrm2 11y ago

This is a silly argument. 1. Assume false. 2. Anything follows. For what odd-ball definition of "far reaching" is "anything" not "far reaching"? An assumption doesn't have to be an Axiom to have "far reaching" consequences. Period. So, you're wrong -- assuming non-foundational axioms can have far reaching consequences. Assumptions are assumptions, and flaws are flaws. Assuming "false" is just as bad as working with an inconsistent foundations. It's just a fact. That said, the actual difference you're trying to elucidate is sociological, not technical -- you suppose that people are less likely to accept non-foundational assumptions, and so that'll check back something from a sociological viewpoint. You assume people won't build results on top of a system with an unproven assumption thrown in. That argument would be a lot more compelling if Mathematicians formalized their arguments in terms of an underlying foundations, because then we would always know that all assumptions are checked. But Mathematicians don't work like that. And errors creep in. And if people build on top of those errors, it can be pretty catastrophic. In short, what matters is that people accept the incorrect fact and move forward from it, NOT whether that incorrectness comes from foundations or from something built on top of them. The impact of either depends entirely upon how many people trust the result and build on top of it.

johncolanduoni 11y ago
The whole point is that all of the structural axioms are known to be consistent (relative to ZFC or another foundation) because there exist known models of them. The fact that we don't need to assume group axioms hold, but can instead prove they hold for at least one structure is a huge distinction. There is no way to prove there are models of ZFC or another (suitably powerful) foundational system without appealing to a foundational system in the first place. That is the content of Godel's second incompleteness theorem[1]. So the axioms of ZFC bear some scrutiny, while those of a group etc. don't. This is a completely technical distinction. > That argument would be a lot more compelling if Mathematicians formalized their arguments in terms of an underlying foundations, because then we would always know that all assumptions are checked. But they do! You can find many books on real analysis that prove that the reals exist from the foundation, as well as proving that the naturals and integers exist on the way. They don't constantly refer to the foundations, but they use facts that have been rigorously proved from the foundations. And although they don't write "axiom schema of specification" every time they consider a subset satisfying a property, that doesn't mean they don't know that it is required. > In short, what matters is that people accept the incorrect fact and move forward from it, NOT whether that incorrectness comes from foundations or from something built on top of them. The impact of either depends entirely upon how many people trust the result and build on top of it. My whole point is that you don't have to trust the group axioms, because they can (and typically are) validated relative to ZFC. Since the trivial group can be constructed within ZFC they are consistent in ZFC, full stop. The same goes for refinements like commutative groups. If the group axioms lead to a inconsistency, it can only be because ZFC itself is inconsistent. Do you not think that being a possible source of inconsistency or not is an important distinction? [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Second_incompleteness_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_...

by nmrm2 11y ago

johncolanduoni 11y ago

The whole point is that all of the structural axioms are known to be consistent (relative to ZFC or another foundation) because there exist known models of them. The fact that we don't need to assume group axioms hold, but can instead prove they hold for at least one structure is a huge distinction. There is no way to prove there are models of ZFC or another (suitably powerful) foundational system without appealing to a foundational system in the first place. That is the content of Godel's second incompleteness theorem[1]. So the axioms of ZFC bear some scrutiny, while those of a group etc. don't. This is a completely technical distinction. > That argument would be a lot more compelling if Mathematicians formalized their arguments in terms of an underlying foundations, because then we would always know that all assumptions are checked. But they do! You can find many books on real analysis that prove that the reals exist from the foundation, as well as proving that the naturals and integers exist on the way. They don't constantly refer to the foundations, but they use facts that have been rigorously proved from the foundations. And although they don't write "axiom schema of specification" every time they consider a subset satisfying a property, that doesn't mean they don't know that it is required. > In short, what matters is that people accept the incorrect fact and move forward from it, NOT whether that incorrectness comes from foundations or from something built on top of them. The impact of either depends entirely upon how many people trust the result and build on top of it. My whole point is that you don't have to trust the group axioms, because they can (and typically are) validated relative to ZFC. Since the trivial group can be constructed within ZFC they are consistent in ZFC, full stop. The same goes for refinements like commutative groups. If the group axioms lead to a inconsistency, it can only be because ZFC itself is inconsistent. Do you not think that being a possible source of inconsistency or not is an important distinction? [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Second_incompleteness_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_...