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Any useful citations that could be used if one wanted to submit a patch doing exactly that and have it taken seriously? Something that would spell out exactly
by JoshTriplett 11y ago
Any useful citations that could be used if one wanted to submit a patch doing exactly that and have it taken seriously? Something that would spell out exactly why it makes sense to rip out the entire runtime entropy estimator mechanism beyond making sure there's enough entropy to begin with?
- tptacek 11y agoI believe any such patch is doomed; the Linux randomness maintainer appears to be thoroughly convinced of the utility of /dev/random, which is unfortunate. Many people have tried pointing out this design flaw to him.
- JoshTriplett 11y agoThat's exactly what I had in mind when I was asking for any specific citations you might have that address this. Random patch versus self-appointed "expert" won't go nearly as well as supporting evidence versus lack of supporting evidence. I have a little bit of hope due to this quote from the getrandom(2) manpage: "Unless you are doing long-term key generation (and perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for /dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be sufficient for all purposes." The parenthetical and the second sentence give me some hope. (Related question: is Linux using the most sensible CSPRNG it could be using?) But even if that doesn't work, I can see a few ways around that. Most notably, /dev/random and its associated ongoing accounting could become optional. (This is already something I'd like to do for size reasons.) Then, for compatibility, random could be a symlink to urandom. And yeah, between that and the ongoing battle against the Great Evils of hardware random number generators, the potential of Linux's randomness mechanism seems rather maintainer-limited.
- tptacek 11y agoMaking /dev/random blocking optional doesn't help; in fact, it probably hurts, because it allows more Linux code to "safely" use /dev/random, and that code is dangerous on platforms where /dev/random does the old Linux thing.
- JoshTriplett 11y agoI'm not saying /dev/random's blocking would be optional; I'm saying the driver backing /dev/random would be entirely optional. Making it a link to urandom rather than having it entirely missing just avoids breaking old (misguided) userspace that still uses it; breaking userspace would make the proposal less likely to be accepted. Convincing various userspace components to switch to urandom, and for that matter fixing the documentation to stop recommending /dev/random, is a separate battle.