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Ah, I think the delegation problem with the X.509 / HTTPS PKI is a (fairly massive) implementation facepalm, not anything inherent to a PKI itself. So I think t
by geofft 11y ago
Ah, I think the delegation problem with the X.509 / HTTPS PKI is a (fairly massive) implementation facepalm, not anything inherent to a PKI itself. So I think that's why people were confused by your statement "DNSSEC got PKI wrong" -- that doesn't seem wrong, it seems like a good thing for a PKI to support this. Do you think that a DNSSEC replacement should match the X.509 PKI in this regard?
- oconnore 11y agoAh, that makes sense. Sorry for the confusion I created. I meant that DNSSEC PKI is wrong in the sense that it is hierarchical, and the root keys are centrally controlled by a biased party. A better PKI would probably look like Convergence [1], where trust is derived from a hybrid CA/"web of trust" system formed by a network of notaries. The delegation implemented in DNSSEC is a good thing. I didn't think about how that feature would quite reasonably be lumped in with "PKI". Oops. [1]: http://convergence.io/ http://convergence.io/
- indolering 11y agoMarlinspike abandoned convergence a year after it was debuted. It's currently broken on most (all?) platforms. As covered in the article, Convergence-style triangulation of cryptographic information is application/protocol neutral. Indeed, a DNS-level implementation would be much more powerful than what can be accomplished with HTTPS.
- tptacek 11y agoHe moved from Convergence to TACK, which is on hold during the rollout of HPKP, which is like 80% of the value proposition of TACK.
- cpach 11y agoWhat’s in the missing 20%?
- indolering 11y agoIt's still vulnerable to MITM attacks on the first connection.
- cpach 11y agoAh. What is TACK’s proposal to prevent that from happening?