The problem that you describe is not an SGX problem, it is an OS trust problem. The current trust model for general purpose computing is such that a processor i

The problem that you describe is not an SGX problem, it is an OS trust problem. The current trust model for general purpose computing is such that a processor is not in a position to prevent a malicious OS from controlling which applications run, whether that processor supports SGX or not. The malicious OS may of course use SGX if it wants to ensure that unprivileged code has not been tampered with, but do not equate tamper proofing with keeping end users out. SGX does not strengthen a malicious OS at the expense of user software. On the contrary, it provides computing services directly to an application, removing supervisor code from the TCB of the application. That having been said, I agree that any move to keep users out of their own systems is troubling and that users should be cautious and not take security and trust claims at face value.