3 ms·

SGX is terrifying. Botnets are not the main problem. Windows (N+1) using SGX to make it hard/impossible to remove the spyware (and other junk)[1] is the problem

by pdkl95 11y ago

SGX is terrifying. Botnets are not the main problem. Windows (N+1) using SGX to make it hard/impossible to remove the spyware (and other junk)[1] is the problem. As an example, take a "trusted" environment[2] and add SGX as a way of keeping end users out of the TEE. While it is still early, SGX may be a key battlefield in the War On General Purpose Computing. [1] e.g. the stuff discussed recently https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9976298 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9976298 [2] http://i.imgur.com/rjbzWyB.jpg http://i.imgur.com/rjbzWyB.jpg

yk 11y ago
Is Doctorow's 28c3 keynote so well known, that a link is not necessary anymore? http://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-purp.html http://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-p...
userbinator 11y ago
Very terrifying indeed. IMHO these days there is far too much freedom being traded away for security, and users are gradually conditioned toward it. The thinking is almost like "How about we put everyone in prison, because some percentage of them will become criminals anyway?" Back then it was relatively easy to patch your OS --- even if it was proprietary and closed-source --- to make it behave how you wanted to, if you knew what to change (see all the Windows customising forums for an example, and the whole cracking community.) You didn't have to give up proprietary software completely and move to something like Linux. Now it's become much harder, and I feel that the middle ground between fully open-source and fully closed has mostly disappeared as the two communities are gradually distancing from each other. http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html
- pdkl95 11y ago
  The ability to use a General Purpose Computer and an IP address (non-NAT!) gives anybody the ability to publish without any gateway or authority being able to control what can be published. This is real power, in the long-term. It is logical that the people who traditionally hold the power of what information can be published to large audiences - that is, the people that used to control the scarce resources that limited publication - would really like to see all these troubling technologies stuffed back into Pandora's Box and locked away behind the traditional gatekeepers where they won't cause trouble. It's called the Digital Imprimatur[1], and it has been implemented while everybody else was busy distracted by technical minutia and dreams of stock options. Locking down "true"-root access with SGX (or other hardware tricks like SecureBoot) is one of the last steps. If we fail fight this trend right now... well... what good is a compiler when you can't trust[2] the environment it is running in? [1] https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/ https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/ [2] (pdf) https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp...
- MichaelGG 11y ago
  It's "terrifying" but it's also something that's often desired. For example, SGX could enable things like a trusted Bitcoin mixer. Or a trusted telephony provider. Remote code trusting is pretty cool for such scenarios where the other option is "well, sure, you gotta trust the site, but...". The downside is that it'll be too juicy for DRM and games to pass up, and that's shitty and most likely outweighs the benefit. Perhaps if Intel had limited SGX to server workloads and gave us AVX512 instead. (I'm guessing on SGX here. I am unaware of any detailed info on how exactly it'll work, how the remote attestation works.)
  - ngneer 11y ago
    Lots of info here: http://sgxisca.weebly.com/ http://sgxisca.weebly.com/ Not a whole lot on remote attestation though
    - MichaelGG 11y ago
      Thanks, that looks very useful!
  - bryanbuckley 11y ago
    why do you need Bitcoin if you can trust the remote code? ;)
ngneer 11y ago
The problem that you describe is not an SGX problem, it is an OS trust problem. The current trust model for general purpose computing is such that a processor is not in a position to prevent a malicious OS from controlling which applications run, whether that processor supports SGX or not. The malicious OS may of course use SGX if it wants to ensure that unprivileged code has not been tampered with, but do not equate tamper proofing with keeping end users out. SGX does not strengthen a malicious OS at the expense of user software. On the contrary, it provides computing services directly to an application, removing supervisor code from the TCB of the application. That having been said, I agree that any move to keep users out of their own systems is troubling and that users should be cautious and not take security and trust claims at face value.

by pdkl95 11y ago

yk 11y ago

Is Doctorow's 28c3 keynote so well known, that a link is not necessary anymore? http://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-purp.html http://boingboing.net/2011/12/27/the-coming-war-on-general-p...

userbinator 11y ago

Very terrifying indeed. IMHO these days there is far too much freedom being traded away for security, and users are gradually conditioned toward it. The thinking is almost like "How about we put everyone in prison, because some percentage of them will become criminals anyway?" Back then it was relatively easy to patch your OS --- even if it was proprietary and closed-source --- to make it behave how you wanted to, if you knew what to change (see all the Windows customising forums for an example, and the whole cracking community.) You didn't have to give up proprietary software completely and move to something like Linux. Now it's become much harder, and I feel that the middle ground between fully open-source and fully closed has mostly disappeared as the two communities are gradually distancing from each other. http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html

pdkl95 11y ago
The ability to use a General Purpose Computer and an IP address (non-NAT!) gives anybody the ability to publish without any gateway or authority being able to control what can be published. This is real power, in the long-term. It is logical that the people who traditionally hold the power of what information can be published to large audiences - that is, the people that used to control the scarce resources that limited publication - would really like to see all these troubling technologies stuffed back into Pandora's Box and locked away behind the traditional gatekeepers where they won't cause trouble. It's called the Digital Imprimatur[1], and it has been implemented while everybody else was busy distracted by technical minutia and dreams of stock options. Locking down "true"-root access with SGX (or other hardware tricks like SecureBoot) is one of the last steps. If we fail fight this trend right now... well... what good is a compiler when you can't trust[2] the environment it is running in? [1] https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/ https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/digital-imprimatur/ [2] (pdf) https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thomp...
MichaelGG 11y ago
It's "terrifying" but it's also something that's often desired. For example, SGX could enable things like a trusted Bitcoin mixer. Or a trusted telephony provider. Remote code trusting is pretty cool for such scenarios where the other option is "well, sure, you gotta trust the site, but...". The downside is that it'll be too juicy for DRM and games to pass up, and that's shitty and most likely outweighs the benefit. Perhaps if Intel had limited SGX to server workloads and gave us AVX512 instead. (I'm guessing on SGX here. I am unaware of any detailed info on how exactly it'll work, how the remote attestation works.)
- ngneer 11y ago
  Lots of info here: http://sgxisca.weebly.com/ http://sgxisca.weebly.com/ Not a whole lot on remote attestation though
  - MichaelGG 11y ago
    Thanks, that looks very useful!
- bryanbuckley 11y ago
  why do you need Bitcoin if you can trust the remote code? ;)

ngneer 11y ago

The problem that you describe is not an SGX problem, it is an OS trust problem. The current trust model for general purpose computing is such that a processor is not in a position to prevent a malicious OS from controlling which applications run, whether that processor supports SGX or not. The malicious OS may of course use SGX if it wants to ensure that unprivileged code has not been tampered with, but do not equate tamper proofing with keeping end users out. SGX does not strengthen a malicious OS at the expense of user software. On the contrary, it provides computing services directly to an application, removing supervisor code from the TCB of the application. That having been said, I agree that any move to keep users out of their own systems is troubling and that users should be cautious and not take security and trust claims at face value.