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If I understand correctly, Open Whisper servers are still needed for TextSecure/Signal applications to work, there are even some initial keys involved, and if t
by acqq 11y ago
If I understand correctly, Open Whisper servers are still needed for TextSecure/Signal applications to work, there are even some initial keys involved, and if these servers were actually malicious, everything would be compromised?
That would mean that checking the open sources they publish doesn't help as we don't know what they actually do on the server side.
Now I'd very much like to be proven wrong, so if anybody knows any independent work that claims that the protocols are made so that what's on the server doesn't matter, please post and I thank you in advance.
Also, does anybody know if the sources they publish are enough to make the fully independent infrastructure (run own servers)?
- zmanian 11y agoOut of band verification of key fingerprints is necessary to protect against a malicious server. Users are encouraged to tweet their public keys and verify in person. We don't have any mechanism other than trusting Whisper Systems that their client binaries matches the sources. The truly paranoid could be their own client application from source.
- acqq 11y agoDo you talk about TextSecure or PGP when you talk about "out of band verification of key fingerprints"? I'm talking about TextSecure. And I'm not interested in the client side, but in the server side of the security. I assume I can rebuild the client using the sources and compare their client with my build. What I can't assume is that their servers aren't, for example, infested by some state security malware which takes over the control. I want the protocols that work even when the server is subverted.
- zmanian 11y agoTextsecure has out of band fingerprint verification. There are that are working on eliminating the need for central server for message delivery and key server roles like https://briarproject.org/ https://briarproject.org/ https://github.com/muttr/whitepaper/blob/master/README.md https://github.com/muttr/whitepaper/blob/master/README.md
- acqq 11y agoI don't see what these other projects you link to change to the TextSecure protocol. What I'm interested in is this part of the protocol description: https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ "At registration time, the TextSecure client preemptively generates 100 signed key exchange messages and sends them to the server. We call these “prekeys.” A client that wishes to send a secure message to a user for the first time can now: - Connect to the server and request the destination’s next “prekey.”" Etc. How is this not giving the server chance to insert its own keys and not the ones user generated? What the QR code thing is actually doing? From what I understand, the TextSecure/Signal in one way or another send your contacts to the server and the server stores "prekeys" and delivers them to the clients. Where is any analysis that says that all this stuff doesn't mean that we have to trust that the server is not evil? If the QR code means "yes it's the person you want to communicate to" but the contacts are on the server and the prekeys are delivered from the server, am I any better? I need to read somewhere that the server is not weak point and why it is not. Any link?
- caf 11y agoHow is this not giving the server chance to insert its own keys and not the ones user generated? Because the server can't sign the key exchange messages - the private key is generated on the client and never leaves it.
- acqq 11y agoSo would everything be safe if the server is controlled by an attacker and the attacker can also act as MtM for the communication data? Is there any analysis/verification of the full protocol and/or whole process of TextSecure/Signal as they are commonly used? I'd greatly appreciate the link.
- Canada 11y agoThe server code is available, people can and do run their own. Several other parties not affiliated with Whisper have written compatible clients. Lots of people are actively looking at and contributing to the official clients. It really is private end to end. The server is merely a router and keyserver.
- acqq 11y agoIf I understand, somehow the server delivers the initial keys to clients ("to make the process easier"). What happens if some evildoer takes control of Text Secure servers? Can the evildoer read all the communication from that point on, provided he can also capture the encrypted traffic (which is reasonable to assume)? The protocol "safe from the server turning malicious" would also be good even if I'd run my own server to prevent Text Secure servers getting all the contacts.
- Canada 11y agoThe server has the keys in roughly the same way a PGP keyserver has the keys. They're all public keys, and they would be sent in the clear anyway, however storing them with the server enables senders to send to recipients who are offline. The server can't make use of them to read any communication. It's possible for the server to hand out the wrong key for a user, but the clients detect that. There are other ways for users to mount impersonation attacks without server cooperation anyway. The server also knows who talks to who, when, how big those messages are, and the number of attachments and their sizes. An adversary who can passively watch the server's encrypted traffic will also be able to determine some of these things, but not as easily or precisely. All the TextSecure server is really trusted to do is a good job of confirming a user who purports to have a certain phone number really does control that number at registration time.
- acqq 11y agoSo if the server is under the control of the attacker and I use TextSecure expecting to "just work" (not already having the private key of my contact) I can actually communicate with the attacker instead of with my contact? And if I already have the private key of my contact, why do I need the TextSecure server at all?