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It's not the same as China. China is putting police in local (Chinese) companies with Chinese citizens in Chinese companies. That's kind of different than req

by prewett 11y ago

It's not the same as China. China is putting police in local (Chinese) companies with Chinese citizens in Chinese companies. That's kind of different than requiring a citizen in the office of a foreign company doing business locally. I expect that the intent is different, although I don't know US law. The Chinese intent is to (forcibly?) prevent unwanted communication. I doubt that is the intent of the US law.

jpollock 11y ago
Actually, CALEA [2] is a requirement for all US carriers (ISPs/telcos), it's just an extra requirement on anyone peering with a US firm. It's also been around since 1994. CALEA intercepts are implemented through automated systems, the judge signs a warrant, it's entered into a computer and the wiretaps are done automatically, with the traffic routed to the requesting agency's systems. In China, they probably noticed that they don't have a legal intercept facility built in, and don't want to spend the time to negotiate with all of the interested parties. So, they put a person on site. The threat and the outcome is the same. If you don't provide legal intercept, you're going to get locked up. For an example of what level of access these systems provide, a Greek carrier was hacked through theirs - the hacker(s) turned it on and used it to listen in on the Prime Minister's phone calls[1]. I'm not saying that the Chinese are doing the right thing, just that it's largely equivalent to what happens here. [1] http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...
- anseljh 11y ago
  Intercepts with warrants is really, really different than giving unaccountable thought police a desk in the news room. Equating these things is silly and borderline offensive.

by prewett 11y ago

jpollock 11y ago

Actually, CALEA [2] is a requirement for all US carriers (ISPs/telcos), it's just an extra requirement on anyone peering with a US firm. It's also been around since 1994. CALEA intercepts are implemented through automated systems, the judge signs a warrant, it's entered into a computer and the wiretaps are done automatically, with the traffic routed to the requesting agency's systems. In China, they probably noticed that they don't have a legal intercept facility built in, and don't want to spend the time to negotiate with all of the interested parties. So, they put a person on site. The threat and the outcome is the same. If you don't provide legal intercept, you're going to get locked up. For an example of what level of access these systems provide, a Greek carrier was hacked through theirs - the hacker(s) turned it on and used it to listen in on the Prime Minister's phone calls[1]. I'm not saying that the Chinese are doing the right thing, just that it's largely equivalent to what happens here. [1] http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...

anseljh 11y ago
Intercepts with warrants is really, really different than giving unaccountable thought police a desk in the news room. Equating these things is silly and borderline offensive.