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I agree with you, but the article is making a pretty strong argument that indexing discourages competition in a way that makes everyone worse off. "[Elhauge:]
by mcguire 11y ago
I agree with you, but the article is making a pretty strong argument that indexing discourages competition in a way that makes everyone worse off.
"[Elhauge:] 'Fourth, if index funds alone would create a problem of anticompetitive horizontal shareholding in a concentrated market, and those index funds feel the benefits of diversification across all firms in that market exceed the benefits of influencing corporate governance, they could commit not to communicate with management or vote their shares.'"
I believe that is the case now: index funds don't vote or attempt to influence management (at least I've never heard of it). Also, each individual fund is limited in the proportion of an individual company it can own, but that limit does not apply to the total sum of index funds.
"If you think that institutional investors are causing managers to stop competing, there are more plausible mechanisms for that than voting. Just leaving managers alone, for instance, probably itself tends toward anti-competitiveness: If shareholders don't pester management, they will probably compete less hard, just because that is easier. 'Voting with their feet' is another: If shareholders invest indifferently in both the best and the fourth-best firm in an industry, that will keep up the fourth-best firm's stock price and lower the best's, reducing incentives to be the best. Or there is just fiduciary duty: Managers may want to do what's in their shareholders' best interests because that is what they are supposed to be doing. Even if the shareholders don't actively force them to."
In fact, as I understand it, index investing is just an end-spectrum case of institutional investing in general, and "Posner and Weyl blame institutional investors for income inequality. Elhauge blames them for runaway executive pay, and for the rise in corporate profits unaccompanied by economic growth and investment."
Runaway executive pay, for example, seems to be a consequence of interlocking executive roles: the manager of this company is a director of that, and vice-versa, resulting in a positive feedback loop.
I am, and have been for a long time, a major index investor; a big chunk of my portfolio is in various indexes. But it's already the case that a good way to get an extra boost is to buy the shares of a company just before it enters the S&P500. If the indices are having effects in the other direction, there may be problems in store.
How about this for a universal law?
Nothing in economics is an unbalanced positive.
- kspaans 11y agoVanguard definitely uses its proxy votes: https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/ https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/