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There is a huge UX problem with validating the legitimacy of anything online. I have to know that credentials are available, and I have to know that it's possib
by moron4hire 11y ago
There is a huge UX problem with validating the legitimacy of anything online. I have to know that credentials are available, and I have to know that it's possible to validate them. How do I even know if a particular set of credentials are legit? I'd have to know where to find validation for them. That's a whole other ball of wax in itself.
And we default to not requiring such authentication because the means we have are either completely useless (i.e. passwords) or so onerous (I always have to Google when I setup cryptographic credentials on anything, and we expect lay users to do this?) that they ruin adoption rates for software and services.
State-of-the-art secure credentialing should be as easy as passwords. Easier, even. Yet they're currently as "easy" as configuring Apache.
- XorNot 11y agoThere's also the issue that securing these things is tricky. How do I secure and sync a gpg keg? Should I load a private meeting on my work PC? My phone?
- cbd1984 11y agoAny information you can get online or over the phone can be forged. (Passwords can be discovered, as can private keys, fingerprints, and the results of genetic tests.) Certain kinds of physical evidence, such as dead skin cells with usable genetic material in them, are to my knowledge effectively impossible to forge, but they can be "accidentally" contaminated beyond usability. Doing things in-person face-to-face is only an improvement if you knew the person before anyone had any incentive to fool you on the person's identity, which is hard; even then, allegiances can be bought, sold, and changed for other reasons. My point is that fixing this issue is out-of-scope for a DVCS. It could, however, be improved a bit.